Military Aviation Operations

FY2026 Signals Joint Defense Tech The Pentagon isn’t looking for more tech. It’s looking for tech that fits the fight. What wins? interoperable, multi-domain, coalition-ready tech that aligns with how the U.S. and its allies will fight. Hear me out… 1. Integration Is the Mission PE 0604826J is the COG for CJADC2. It funds interoperability pilots with NATO, secure data sharing across services, and cross-domain C2 experiments like Bold Quest. Your tech needs to plug into this joint ecosystem. 2. Multi-Domain C2 Is Non-Negotiable The budget holds firm on digital datalinks, secure comms, and allied data exchange. Your tech must talk across domains and allies, don’t expect traction. 3. Rapid Prototyping Isn’t Dead—It’s Evolving RDER may be gone, but its intent lives on. The budget still backs prototypes that can shape joint force design. Demo utility in a joint context and watch your TRL skyrocket. 4. Congress ‘All In on Joint Tech’ is a buying signal. • $400M → Joint Fires Network • $400M → Joint battle management tools • $1B → Accelerated tech fielding • $2B → DIU scaling commercial tech 5. AI/ML, Autonomy, C5ISR—Joint prioritization isn’t just lip service. Budget lines explicitly call out: • Multi-service unmanned systems • Maritime robotics • Coalition-ready EW and ISR

In recent months, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience and innovation in its maritime strategy, achieving significant victories at sea. The article “Ukraine’s Victory at Sea: How Kyiv Subdued the Russian Fleet – and What It Will Need to Build on Naval Success” highlights how Ukraine has effectively used several key strategies to challenge and counter Russian naval operations, including: - Integration of Drones: Deploying maritime drones for reconnaissance and precision strikes against Russian naval targets. - Use of Cruise Missiles: Employing advanced cruise missiles to disrupt and damage key Russian naval assets from a distance. - Naval Mine Warfare: Utilizing naval mines to block and inflict damage on Russian vessels, restricting their operational capabilities. - Adaptation of Commercial Vessels: Converting commercial vessels into armed platforms to extend Ukraine’s operational reach. - Enhanced Intelligence Sharing: Leveraging improved intelligence and surveillance for effective targeting and planning. These strategies demonstrate a highly adaptive approach to modern naval warfare. By leveraging advanced technologies and repurposing existing assets, Ukraine has gained critical maritime advantages, showcasing how innovation and adaptability can shift the balance in asymmetric conflicts and achieve strategic objectives.

Ukraine’s success against the Russian navy is making the Pentagon nervous – and rightfully so. The US Navy is now actively training to counter the threat posed by autonomous, explosive-laden drone boats. During Baltic Operations 2025, Task Force 66 used uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) to simulate swarm-style attacks on ships like the USS Mount Whitney and USS Paul Ignatius. This training is a direct response to what Ukraine has pulled off against Russia since the start of the invasion. In the Black Sea, Ukraine’s drones have sunk dozens of Russian vessels, forcing Moscow to relocate its fleet to safer harbors. Fast, cheap, and lethal, these USVs have rendered legacy naval thinking obsolete almost overnight. The US military has been aware of this threat since the infamous Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame more than two decades ago, but here’s what planners are recognizing now: - Conventional defenses like manned gun stations and missiles struggle against agile, low-profile drones - Awareness must extend below radar to give service members enough time to detect and engage fast-moving threats - There’s no silver bullet: it will take a combination of sensors, kinetic weapons, and autonomy to effectively meet this moment Luckily, our Navy is leading the way. Task Force 66, formed last year, is integrating robotic systems into fleet operations and developing tactics for maritime theaters where speed, flexibility, and autonomy matter most. If aircraft carriers and destroyers remain the Navy’s most valuable naval assets, then they must also be protected with dynamic, intelligent counter-drone systems. The maritime battlefield is evolving – we need solutions that evolve with it.

Command Without Control: Is NATO’s New Vision the Future of C2? 🛡️🌐 NATO’s Cross-Domain Command (CDC) concept (May 2025) challenges the very foundation of military leadership. The core provocation? In a multi-domain world, you must be able to command what you cannot control. This marks a shift from a rigid hierarchy to a model more like civilian strategic leadership: placing a premium on the ability to align, influence, and mobilise a diverse network of actors over whom you have no formal authority. The Shift: ❶ From Hierarchy to Network: Traditional hierarchies will, to a wide extent, be replaced by fluid, episodic structures focused on Unity of Effort (as opposed to unity of command). ❷ Radical Mission Command: Leaders must mobilise diverse actors, from cyber experts to civilian partners, without formal authority. A revitalised form of mission command. ❸ Agile Targeting: Planning must move at the speed of relevance, integrating effects across all domains simultaneously.  Theory vs. Reality: We already see elements of this in Ukraine, in total defence approaches with multiple state actors, at the higher military command levels, and in complex UN missions. The future is already here. The Challenge: The main challenge is cultural, not technological. The CDC demands a total rethink of our leadership mindset. How can we command in an environment where authority is fluid and agility is our primary currency? 💡 Our Research: As part of our project on contemporary command, Anne and I have prepared a teaching note to help think through this shift in Multi-Domain Operations C2. Our interview data offer ideas to overcome this challenge. And perhaps the rigid, vertical hierarchy, especially at the highest levels or in multinational operations, was always more of a fantasy than a reality. 👉 Read our teaching note here:  https://lnkd.in/etFh5ha4

Autonomous & Unmanned Systems in Multi-Domain Operations: From Tools to Integrated Capabilities Autonomous and unmanned systems (UxS) are no longer “future concepts.” They are shaping today’s battlespaces, supporting civilian resilience, and redefining how we secure critical infrastructure. But their impact is not limited to hardware. For UxS to truly enhance Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), we must address people, processes, culture, and mindset: 🔹 Process – UxS change the tempo of operations. They demand modular, scalable digital backbones that enable secure interoperability and real-time integration across air, land, sea, cyber, and space. 🔹 People – Operators must move from system-by-system management to orchestrating missions across swarms, sensors, and data streams. Skills in autonomy, AI, and data fusion are just as critical as piloting. 🔹 Culture & Mindset – Delegation is central. Trusting autonomy means shifting from micromanagement to mission command supported by AI-enabled decision loops (OODA). Leaders must embrace this digital culture. 🔹 Ethics & Governance – UxS and AI must be reliable, secure, ethical, and human-centred. Adoption is not just about what technology can do, but what societies, militaries, and laws are prepared to accept. The role of UxS extends beyond defence: ⚡ Protecting critical infrastructure – ports, energy grids, undersea cables. ⚡ Enhancing disaster response – evacuation, search & rescue, logistics. ⚡ Strengthening national security resilience – ISR, EW, and hybrid threat countermeasures. What we’ve seen in Ukraine is clear: autonomy evolves weekly, not in decades. Yet our defence cycles are still built for long-lifecycle platforms. To close this gap, we need: ✅ End-to-end integration — not just standalone systems, but capabilities embedded into missions. ✅ Cross-domain sensor fusion and secure digital backbones to connect operators, commanders, and assets. ✅ Collaboration across nations, industry, academia, and end-users to accelerate adoption. At Solita, this is where we focus: connecting the dots from design and governance, to secure AI, to digital backbones and real-time mission integration. Our role is to make autonomy not just smarter but operational, trusted, and truly multi-domain. If information was once power, today sharing and acting on information is power. And autonomous systems when integrated correctly are the multiplier.

For the first time in the history of world wars, a group strike by naval drones guided through a space satellite destroyed a warship that was on the move on the high seas in full combat readiness. On February 1, 2024, marine drones of the Group 13 unit of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry destroyed a Russian Project 12411 missile boat in the Black Sea near a protected naval base on Lake Donuzlav in temporarily occupied Crimea. The Project 12411 missile boat, with a displacement of up to 500 tons and a crew of 40, is armed with supersonic Moskit P-270 anti-ship missiles. Judging by the video, a group of at least five marine drones of the Defense Ministry's GSD attacked the missile boat one after another, apparently carrying out combat patrols and base defense. It should be noted that Russian intelligence did not notice the drone approach. The crew of the missile boat - according to the GSD, it was an Ivanovets - judging by the video, noticed the approach of the drones visually only just before the attack. The boat was on the move at the time of the attack and could maneuver. A missile boat can reach speeds of more than 30 knots and simply evade the drones. But the Ivanovets did not have time to gain speed. The AK-176 76-millimeter anti-aircraft artillery launcher, as seen, was in the camping position, that is, it was not turned on and did not open fire. It is also not noticeable that the Russians had time to bring two 30 mm AK-630 anti-aircraft artillery systems, which are capable of close-range close fire on moving targets. But apparently, the drones were hit by machine-gun fire at close range by the next watch. However, due to the small size, speed and maneuverability of the drones, the Russians failed to hit them. The Group 13 commanders' skillfully chosen attack tactics are admirable - the first drone hit the stern of the boat from the starboard side to disable the propellers. The boat could not develop full speed, but did not stop. Then the second drone also hit the propellers, but from the port side. With these two strikes the boat was reliably deprived of power and maneuver. After that, the ship was competently finished. The third drone hit in the middle of the hull under the Moskit missile launchers and caused a large hole in the left side. No video of this drone is shown. But the results of the hit can be seen from the camera of the fourth drone, which the operator aimed directly into the crater from the third drone at the same location. The explosion from the fourth drone was fatal to the ship. The impact detonated four Moskit missiles with a total mass of four tons each. The Ivanovets missile boat was literally blown to pieces, and there was almost no chance to save the crew. The brilliant success of the Ukrainian soldiers, the command and operators of Group 13 of the Defense Ministry's GSD showed a high level of intelligence, planning, preparation and management of the operation.

Ukraine just used a $100K underwater drone to strike a $300M Russian submarine in port. This is asymmetric naval warfare; small, autonomous, distributed systems versus large platforms. Ukraine has little naval fleet left. Russia operates the Black Sea Fleet with submarines, destroyers, and cruisers. Yet Ukraine was able to hit Russia in Novorossiysk, a port that was considered safe. This is what the Hedge Strategy looks like in combat. Force multiplication through autonomous systems you can afford to lose, threatening platforms the enemy can't.

🧭 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐒𝐭𝐫𝐮𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐁𝐞𝐡𝐢𝐧𝐝 𝐄𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐩𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 — 𝐀𝐧𝐝 𝐖𝐡𝐲 𝐈𝐭 𝐌𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐬 𝐌𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐓𝐡𝐚𝐧 𝐄𝐯𝐞𝐫 Most organizations still view Enterprise Architecture as a set of documents, frameworks, or isolated practices. But in reality, EA is a 𝐦𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐢-𝐝𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 that connects strategy, data, applications, and technology into one coherent operating system for the enterprise. This model captures the architecture layers that quietly shape every transformation decision — from cloud migrations to data modernization to customer-experience redesign. Here’s how I break it down 👇 🏛️ 𝟏. 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐅𝐨𝐮𝐫 𝐂𝐨𝐫𝐞 𝐄𝐀 𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐬 Every enterprise, regardless of industry, runs on these architectural pillars: • Business Architecture → value streams, capabilities, processes • Information Architecture → data, semantics, quality, governance • Application Architecture → portfolio, integration, events, SaaS adoption • Technology Architecture → compute, network, middleware, storage, security When these are misaligned, transformation slows. When they’re unified, execution accelerates. 🔍 𝟐. 𝐄𝐀 𝐒𝐞𝐠𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐬 𝐓𝐡𝐚𝐭 𝐃𝐫𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥 𝐂𝐡𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐞 Behind each domain sits a set of specialised segments that determine maturity: • Strategy & Organisation — ensures EA is not an IT exercise, but a business one • Data Architecture & Governance — MDM, data quality, BI, semantics • Application Runtime & Integration — SOA, events, API-driven ecosystems • Infrastructure Foundations — compute, storage, middleware, voice, wireless, monitoring Modern enterprises win by stitching these layers into one connected digital backbone. 🛠️ 𝟑. 𝐒𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐄𝐱𝐞𝐜𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐄𝐧𝐠𝐢𝐧𝐞 At the project level, EA comes to life through: • 𝐁𝐮𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 • 𝐃𝐚𝐭𝐚 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 • 𝐀𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 • 𝐓𝐞𝐜𝐡𝐧𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐠𝐲 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 • 𝐍𝐞𝐭𝐰𝐨𝐫𝐤 𝐀𝐫𝐜𝐡𝐢𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬 This is where strategic intent becomes solution design and, ultimately, delivered outcomes. 🎯 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 Strong Enterprise Architecture isn’t built on frameworks — it’s built on 𝐜𝐥𝐚𝐫𝐢𝐭𝐲, 𝐜𝐨𝐡𝐞𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐜𝐚𝐩𝐚𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲 across these domains. When EA functions as the connective tissue of the organisation, transformation becomes predictable, scalable, and measurable. 💬 Which EA domain is the toughest to mature in your organisation — Business, Data, Application, or Technology? ➕ Follow Sumeet Goenka 🔔 ♻️ Repost | 💬 Comment | 👍 Like 🚀 Visit Yallo and stay connected for more insights 👉 https://vist.ly/4k9xs Image Credit: Co Virtual #EnterpriseArchitecture #DigitalTransformation #ArchitectureStrategy #BusinessArchitecture #TechLeadership

The "sensor-to-shooter" cycle is no longer a human-speed problem; it’s a data-orchestration problem. Reflecting on the British Army's ASGARD targeting web and Canada’s evolving Pan-Domain Command & Control (PDC2) construct, the architectural DNA is strikingly similar. The opportunity for synergy isn't just a "nice to have" - it’s a strategic opportunity. Here are 6 areas where the two efforts converge: 1. Digital Targeting & Effects Orchestration. ASGARD compresses the cycle through AI-enabled nomination. For PDC2, this is the "application layer" that turns raw data into decision advantage—collaborating on AI-assisted target development is a massive opportunity. 2. Data Fusion at Scale. Both programs are moving toward data fabrics that ingest multi-domain ISR. Common challenges in pattern-of-life modeling and confidence scoring offer a chance to align on shared data standards from the outset. 3. Hybrid Cloud & Edge. Architectures Resilient infrastructure is the backbone. Design patterns are familiar: air-gapped sovereign data, private clouds for analytics, and edge compute for forward exploitation. Deployable edge nodes are a natural joint development space. 4. Cross-Domain Information between Allies. Sharing targeting is only as effective as the data that can legally move. We are both wrestling with classification barriers and coalition releasability. Joint work on machine-to-machine exchange will pay dividends across the Five Eyes. 5. Human-Machine Teaming & Governance. AI is embedding deeper into the kill web, raising shared questions on trust, legal oversight, and ROE digitization. This is a critical space for allied doctrinal and ethical alignment. 6. Coalition "Interoperability by Design". If CJADC2/ MDO speak to the is the digital spine, national webs like ASGARD and PDC2 are the operational nodes. Designing them to federate- not just integrate- ensures we are ready for a multi-domain fight. The Bottom Line: Modern targeting is becoming software-defined, data-centric, and coalition-federated. No nation can build these ecosystems in isolation. Cross pollination will obviously be key. How do we balance sovereign data requirements with the need for federated mission partner access in a contested environment? #Defence #Defense #PDC2 #ASGARD #MultiDomainOperations #AI #C4ISR #DigitalTransformation #DecisionAdvantage #FiveEyes #NATO

𝐌𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐢-𝐃𝐨𝐦𝐚𝐢𝐧 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬: 𝐓𝐡𝐞 𝐀𝐫𝐦𝐲’𝐬 𝐀𝐧𝐬𝐰𝐞𝐫 𝐭𝐨 𝐋𝐚𝐲𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐝 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐝-𝐎𝐟𝐟 The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, outlines how the U.S. Army must evolve to deter and, if required, defeat near-peer competitors such as China and Russia. The premise is: U.S. dominance is no longer assured. Adversaries have studied the American way of war and built systems designed to delay, disrupt, and dislocate U.S. power projection. The Problem: Layered Stand-Off In competition, adversaries fracture alliances through information warfare, economic coercion, cyber operations, and calibrated military pressure. They aim to win without crossing the threshold of armed conflict. In war, they operationalize anti-access and area denial networks. Long-range precision fires, integrated air defense, space and cyber capabilities converge to separate U.S. forces in time, space, and function. The objective is speed. Achieve a fait accompli before the Joint Force can respond at scale. Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the Army’s response. It's aim is to: 1.Prevail in competition 2.Penetrate and dis-integrate enemy A2/AD systems 3.Exploit freedom of maneuver 4. Force a return to competition on favorable terms This rests on three core tenets: 1. Calibrated Force Posture Forward presence, expeditionary capability, national-level assets, and the authorities to integrate them. Position and maneuver must be dynamic, not static. 2. Multi-Domain Formations Resilient units capable of independent maneuver inside contested environments. They must integrate cross-domain fires and operate under degraded conditions. 3. Convergence The rapid integration of capabilities across domains to create compounding dilemmas. Convergence is not synchronization by checklist. It is continuous, layered overmatch. The Five Operational Phases MDO addresses five recurring problems across the competition continuum: 1. Compete: Expand the competitive space and blunt adversary information and unconventional warfare. 2. Penetrate: Neutralize long-range systems and enable strategic maneuver. 3.Dis-integrate: Break the coherence of the enemy’s layered defenses. 4. Exploit: Isolate and defeat maneuver forces across physical and cognitive dimensions. 5. Re-compete: Consolidate gains and restore deterrence under new conditions. Future conflict will be hyperactive, contested in every domain, and compressed in time. Sequential campaigns and uncontested buildup are assumptions of the past. If the Joint Force cannot converge effects across land, air, maritime, space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum at speed, it will struggle to penetrate layered stand-off.