Key Takeaways from Large-Scale Combat Operations

📌 𝐈𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐝𝐞 𝐔𝐤𝐫𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐞’𝐬 𝐊𝐮𝐫𝐬𝐤 𝐎𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: 𝐀 𝐒𝐨𝐥𝐝𝐢𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐩𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 🔥 A Ukrainian soldier who fought in the Kursk operation for four months shares his firsthand account of Russian maneuvers, their failures, and the resilience of Ukrainian forces. His insights reveal the intensity of the battle and the shifting dynamics on the frontline. 🔹 Key Takeaways: ✅ Russia Threw Its Best Troops at Kursk – The 76th & 106th VDV divisions, elite marine brigades, and top FPV drone operators were deployed, showing how crucial Moscow considered this front. ✅ Russian AFV Assaults Were Ineffective – Large-scale mechanized attacks resulted in catastrophic losses. In one case, 13 BMP-3s and 3 T-80BVMs were wiped out in just three days. Russian forces lost 90-100% of AFVs in every failed attack. ✅ Guided Bomb Barrages – October was the toughest month, with Russia using 84 guided bombs in a single day against a small village and nearby treelines. Foggy conditions allowed for better Russian rotations, yet they mainly attacked on sunny days. ✅ Desperate Russian Tactics – 🔹 Russia repeatedly tried to build bridges over rivers, failing every time. 🔹 They used smoke screens to cover movements, making targeting difficult for Ukrainian defenders. 🔹 Their drone operators were closer to the frontline, allowing for more effective strikes. ✅ Infantry Over Armor – With armored assaults failing, Russian troops shifted to using ATVs instead of BMDs for mobility—a sign of desperation. ✅ Poor Russian Coordination – Ukrainian forces noted that Russian artillery often fired after their armor was already destroyed, rather than providing cover before attacks. ✅ Ukrainian Strength & Lessons Learned – Kursk showcased Ukraine’s adaptability, proving they could fight anywhere. Despite being outnumbered and facing elite Russian troops, Ukrainian forces held their ground and inflicted massive losses on Russia. 🔹 Broader Implications: 📌 Russia’s Strategic Failures – Despite deploying top forces, Moscow’s battlefield tactics were riddled with flaws, leading to major losses. 📌 Ukraine’s Ability to Strike Deep – The Kursk operation proves that Ukraine can bring the fight into Russian territory, disrupting their logistics and forcing the Kremlin into reactive mode. 📌 The Need for More Support – Ukrainian drone operators were instrumental in stopping Russian attacks, but they need more batteries, supplies, and advanced drones to maintain this level of defense. #Ukraine #Kursk #Russia #MilitaryStrategy #Geopolitics #Defense #WarInUkraine #OSINT

Earlier this month, Peter Apps asked me a simple question: what should people actually be reading if they want to understand defence tech and battlefield survivability? One of the first things that came to mind was Snake Island Institute’s Defense Tech Monthly. I just spent time with the November edition of what’s changing on the Ukraine battlefield, and it’s one of the clearest snapshots I’ve seen of how tactics and technology are actually evolving under pressure. A few specific, concrete takeaways that stood out as having changed since last month: • Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) are operational, not experimental- Ukraine successfully conducted UGV casualty evacuation for a soldier who spent 33 days behind enemy lines, showing how robotics are now filling gaps where manned access is no longer survivable. • Armed UGVs are being integrated at the tactical level- Machine-gun-equipped ground robots are being used alongside infantry to suppress Russian APCs and dismounted troops, particularly in covered approaches where human exposure is high. • Russia is rapidly closing the gap with counter-robot and counter-FPV systems- The report documents upgraded EW systems such as “Shtora” and adaptations specifically targeting FPVs and ground robots, reinforcing how short-lived any single advantage has become. • Air defence is being degraded methodically, not symbolically- Ukraine continues dismantling Russian IADS through layered strikes in Crimea against S-400 components, Pantsir systems, radar nodes, and command posts, rather than one-off attacks. • Deep-strike drones are now part of a sustained campaign- Long-range UAVs (including FP-1 variants) are being used systematically against refineries, pipelines, and industrial nodes, targeting logistics and sustainment rather than morale alone. • Maritime and underwater drones are expanding the threat envelope- Operational use of underwater torpedo drones and semi-submersible platforms in the Black Sea is forcing Russia to defend above and below the surface simultaneously. • Counter-UAS remains brittle in real conditions- Snow, ice, terrain clutter, and weather continue to defeat many defensive systems, reinforcing why low-cost drones still overwhelm higher-end defenses. For a European and NATO audience, this matters directly. Many of these lessons are now being absorbed into NATO experimentation efforts, EU capability development, and multinational exercises, from counter-UAS integration to autonomous systems, EW resilience, and logistics protection. But the report makes clear how hard it is for institutions to keep pace with battlefield learning cycles measured in weeks, not years. That’s why resources like Defense Tech Monthly are so valuable. They connect technology, tactics, and survivability without abstraction. If you’re trying to understand defence tech as it actually performs in combat, this is a phenomenal reference. Looking forward to diving into the December edition in the new year.

The Modern War Institute at West Point has published a study of "The Army and the New Paradigm of Ground Combat: Lessons from Ukraine's Failed Counteroffensive." Several key recommendations for future military operations: 1. Doctrine Adaptation: The U.S. Army must shift from traditional combined arms breach tactics to a more dynamic approach focused on isolating enemy positions, synchronizing suppression of critical nodes, and selectively neutralizing threats. 2. Embrace Multidomain Operations: Incorporate advanced technologies like unmanned aerial systems (UAS), electronic warfare, and precision-guided munitions into offensive strategies. Effective UAS deployment and firepower allocation frameworks are crucial. 3. Enhanced Training and Adaptability: Train units to operate under heavy electronic warfare and contested environments, fostering rapid adaptation to evolving battlefield conditions. 4. Force Preservation: Prioritize the conservation of personnel and equipment through better planning and by avoiding high-risk maneuvers unless strategically essential. 5. Expedited Decision-Making: Develop command structures and processes that enable faster and more flexible responses to changing tactical scenarios. 6. Resource Allocation: Focus investments on technologies and systems that enhance lethality, survivability, and battlefield awareness. https://lnkd.in/eQ_tJb4y

On November 08, 1942, Allied forces launched Operation Torch, the first major Anglo-American amphibious landing in the European theater, targeting French North Africa. While the operation is often remembered for the large scale landings of U.S. and British troops, the success of Torch depended in large measure on the work of special operations forces executing reconnaissance, liaison, sabotage, and precision assaults ahead of and alongside conventional forces to shape the environment. Pre-invasion reconnaissance and intelligence gathering were handled primarily by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). OSS operatives like Archibald Roosevelt and Raymond A. Hare conducted covert surveys of French North African ports, beaches, and fortifications, providing actionable intelligence on coastal defenses, minefields, and troop deployments. British units such as No. 11 (Scottish) Commando, No. 1 Commando were tasked with seizing key coastal batteries, ports, and airfields in Morocco and Algeria. Algiers Commandos, working with OSS to operatives, coordinated the swift capture of Algiers harbor and airport, neutralizing defenses before the U.S. landings. These missions created tactical openings, reduced casualties, and allowed the main amphibious forces to consolidate positions more rapidly. Operation Torch illustrated that special operations could assist large scale strategic operations by shaping the battlefield and providing intelligence to create decisive outcomes. #WWII #SpecialOperations #SOF #AlexDekker #Strategy #Tactics #LessonsLearned #History

TRANSFORMING IN CONTACT: THE ARMY IS CHANGING—BECAUSE IT MUST - ISSUE: The Army must adapt to a new era of large-scale combat operations in which time, sanctuary and tolerance for inefficiency have sharply diminished—and legacy assumptions risk catastrophic costs in a peer fight. - SPOTLIGHT SCOPE: Explains why the Army’s ongoing transformation is necessary, outlines the shifting character of war, and highlights key changes in doctrine, force design and industrial capacity required to fight—and win—against major powers. INSIGHTS: Peer war will start fast and strike everywhere; the United States no longer controls the timeline. - Sanctuary is gone—static bases and massed formations are liabilities in contested environments. - The Army’s transformation emphasizes lethality/reach, survivability through dispersion, and human-machine integration. - Industrial base capacity is now decisive; the United States cannot sustain a long war if munitions production lags demand. CONCLUSION -But we must accept a harsh reality: We will fight contested. We will take losses early. And we cannot rely on the tactics of the past to win the wars of the future. Today’s transformation is an attempt to ensure the next generation doesn’t go to war with forces designed for our old fights. We must respect our history, but we cannot be dragged down by nostalgia. The men and women who will fight the next war deserve a force designed for their wars—so that they can deter war and, if deterrence fails, so that they can fight outnumbered and win. -https://lnkd.in/eQpEQsfn

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan gave an insider’s view on India’s theaterisation journey, highlighting how joint operations, technology adoption, and strategic integration are reshaping the country’s military preparedness. Speaking with Nitin Gokhale, Editor-in-Chief, General Chauhan described theatre commands as a game-changer for India’s armed forces, tailored to the nation’s unique strategic and geographic needs. Strategic Coordination, Not Direct Operations Clarifying his mandate, General Chauhan noted that the CDS does not command troops in the field. Instead, he focuses on aligning the three services, providing strategic guidance, and ensuring joint planning. Operational responsibility continues to reside with the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but coordination at the CDS level ensures cohesion across domains. Learning from Experience Success in recent operations, the CDS said, is driven by political clarity, inter-service collaboration, and timely execution rather than any single factor. Lessons from these missions are being applied to theaterisation, helping refine command structures and decision-making processes. Theatre Commands and Future Warfare About 90% of theatre command planning is complete, General Chauhan revealed, with remaining refinements based on operational lessons. He emphasized the growing importance of emerging domains like cyber and cognitive warfare, as well as collaboration with industry and startups to accelerate technological adoption. Military seminars are being redesigned to focus on practical outcomes and actionable strategies. Key Takeaways Joint integration is essential for operational success. Rapid technological change must be met with agility and innovation. Theatre commands are being tailored to India’s strategic realities. Lessons from current operations inform future planning. Chauhan concluded that theaterisation is not just an organizational change but a strategic leap, ensuring India’s armed forces remain agile, integrated, and prepared for the challenges of modern warfare.