Key Findings on Quantum Security Readiness Worldwide

EY’s perspective on securing against #quantum #risks emphasizes that quantum #computing is rapidly evolving from a theoretical concern into a material cybersecurity threat that requires immediate strategic action. The core issue lies in the vulnerability of widely used cryptographic algorithms, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, which could be broken by sufficiently advanced quantum computers. This creates a systemic risk to sensitive data, including financial information, intellectual property, and personal records. A central concept highlighted is the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat model, in which adversaries collect encrypted data today with the intention of decrypting it in the future as quantum capabilities mature. This makes quantum risk a present-day problem, particularly for data requiring long-term confidentiality. EY stresses that organizations must adopt a proactive and structured approach to quantum readiness. A foundational step is to conduct a comprehensive cryptographic inventory, identify sensitive #data, and map existing #encryption methods. This enables organizations to assess which systems are most exposed and prioritize remediation efforts. Transitioning to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a complex, multi-year transformation that requires careful planning, integration into existing #technology roadmaps, and alignment with emerging standards. Organizations are encouraged to build crypto-agility, allowing them to adapt encryption methods as technologies and standards evolve. EY also highlights the importance of #governance, #compliance, and #workforce readiness. Quantum resilience requires enterprise-wide coordination, including policy development, regulatory alignment, continuous monitoring, and personnel training. EY frames quantum cybersecurity not just as a technical upgrade but as a strategic #transformation initiative. Organizations that act early can strengthen resilience, improve cyber maturity, and gain a competitive advantage, while those that delay risk long-term exposure to data breaches, regulatory challenges, and erosion of #digital #trust.

A recent comprehensive study, issued by Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) on the Status of #Quantum #Computer #Development provides a sober, evidence-based assessment of progress, risks, and timelines, particularly relevant for #cryptography, #cybersecurity, and strategic planning, with a focus on applications in #cryptanalysis. Key takeaways: • Quantum advantage is real, but still narrow Quantum computers have demonstrated advantage only on highly specialized benchmark problems. Broad, application-relevant superiority remains out of reach. • Cryptography is the primary strategic risk driver Shor’s algorithm continues to pose a credible long-term threat to RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography, while symmetric cryptography (e.g. AES) remains comparatively resilient with appropriate key lengths. • Fault tolerance is the true bottleneck Error rates not qubit counts are the dominant constraint. Scalable, fault-tolerant quantum computing requires massive overheads in error correction and infrastructure. • Leading hardware platforms are converging Superconducting qubits, trapped ions, and neutral atoms (Rydberg) currently lead the field, with rapid progress but no clear single winner. • #NISQ systems are not a near-term cryptographic threat Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) devices lack the depth and reliability needed for meaningful cryptanalysis, despite frequent hype. • A realistic timeline is emerging Based on verified advances in error correction, a cryptographically relevant quantum computer may be achievable in ~10–15 years—not decades, but not imminent either. • “Harvest now, decrypt later” remains a credible risk Sensitive data encrypted today may be vulnerable in the future, reinforcing the urgency of post-quantum cryptography migration. • Security preparedness must start now Transition planning, crypto-agility, standards development, and quantum-readiness assessments are no longer optional for governments and critical sectors. 👉 Bottom line: quantum computing is progressing steadily, not explosively, but its long-term implications for cybersecurity and digital trust demand early, structured, and risk-based action today. https://lnkd.in/eMui-D_W

While current quantum computers are not yet powerful enough to break widely used cryptographic systems, progress is accelerating. This puts financial institutions on notice: many commonly used public-key cryptographic systems, particularly RSA and ECC, could eventually be compromised, posing systemic risks to confidentiality, integrity, and authentication in financial transactions. To manage this risk, the Bank for International Settlements – BIS’ report proposes a three phases transition framework: 1️⃣ preparing for quantum risk awareness and inventory mapping, 2️⃣ migrating to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) standards once finalized (notably by NIST), and 3️⃣ continuously validating and adapting systems to maintain resilience. Key players (central banks, financial market infrastructures (FMIs), and regulated entities) are advised to act immediately in assessing vulnerabilities and developing mitigation strategies. Cross sector coordination is emphasized as critical to ensure a synchronized and effective transition. The report also highlights the need to prioritize migration in critical areas, such as #payments, #settlement systems, #authentication, and #digitalidentities, all of which rely heavily on cryptographic standards that will become obsolete within a quantum powered processing context. Key conclusions: ➡️ Early experimentation and engagement with standards bodies (e.g., NIST, ETSI) are encouraged to reduce transition friction. ➡️ Financial authorities and central banks should lead by example, upgrading their own systems and setting expectations for regulated entities and financial infrastructures. ➡️ Priority areas for quantum readiness include payment and settlement systems, digital identity schemes, secure communications, and authentication frameworks. ➡️ The risk is not just technical , interdependencies across systems mean that even a single weak link could jeopardize broader financial stability. ➡️ While large-scale quantum attacks may still be a decade away, “harvest now, decrypt later” threats are already plausible, making early action essential. While a full quantum threat may may not be (very) short term, the long lead times required for cryptographic system migration, the high interdependency of financial networks, and the regulatory implications make it imperative to act now. BIS calls for global alignment and proactive leadership to ensure that the transition to quantum-resilient systems is orderly, inclusive, and secure. #technology #ditigal #risk #banking

🚨𝗬𝗼𝘂’𝗿𝗲 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗗𝗮𝘁𝗮 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗮𝘀𝘁, 𝗡𝗼𝘁 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗤𝘂𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘂𝗺 𝗙𝘂𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 Your data may already be compromised. You just don’t know it yet. Most security strategies assume yesterday’s threats. Quantum changes the timeline, not just the technology. Quantum computing doesn’t need to exist at scale to break today’s security. 'Harvest now and Decrypt later has already changed the risk equation. This paper by Mastercard is a wake-up call for #governments, #enterprises, #CISOs and #boards preparing for a post-quantum world. 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗜𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁𝘀 𝗨𝗻𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀𝘁𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗤𝘂𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘂𝗺 𝗧𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁 The real risk is time. • Encrypted data can be stolen today and decrypted later • Long-life data (health, defence, IP, identity) is most exposed • Quantum resource estimates show this is not theoretical anymore 𝗧𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘀𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗼 𝗤𝘂𝗮𝗻𝘁𝘂𝗺-𝗦𝗮𝗳𝗲 𝗦𝘆𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗺𝘀 Risk management must start before quantum arrives. • Crypto agility is now a strategic requirement • Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) emerges as the most scalable path • Quantum safety is about migration planning, not last-minute swaps Security teams must plan for years, not upgrades. 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲𝘀 & 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝘂𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 𝗔𝗿𝗲 𝗖𝗮𝘁𝗰𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗨𝗽 Governments are already moving. • Global mandates now require quantum-safe migration plans • Clear guidance is emerging on PQC vs QKD use cases • Public sector action will soon cascade into enterprise obligations • Compliance pressure will arrive faster than most expect. 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗰𝗲 & 𝗜𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗥𝗲𝗮𝗹𝗶𝘁𝘆 Quantum-safe doesn’t mean business-safe by default. • PQC algorithms vary widely in performance impact • TLS needs redesign, not patching • Hybrid approaches are becoming the practical bridge strategy • Security teams must balance safety, latency, and scale. 𝗣𝗤𝗖 𝗠𝗶𝗴𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗜𝘀 𝗮 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗴𝗿𝗮𝗺𝗺𝗲, 𝗡𝗼𝘁 𝗮 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁 Migration is the hardest part. • Inventory cryptographic assets first • Prioritise systems with long data retention • Test, phase and monitor continuously • There is no “one-and-done” quantum fix. 𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗧𝗮𝗸𝗲𝗮𝘄𝗮𝘆𝘀 ✅ Quantum risk is a present-day governance issue ✅ Waiting for quantum computers is already too late ✅ PQC migration will define future cyber resilience ✅ Security leaders must act before regulators force the move 𝗕𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗼𝗺 𝗟𝗶𝗻𝗲 Quantum security is no longer about cryptography. It’s about foresight, governance, and timing. Those who migrate early will set the standard and who delay will inherit the risk. 👉 If data is harvested today, when does the liability actually begin? #Quantum #QuantumSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #CyberRisk #AIandQuantum #Governance #CISO #Board #DigitalTrust #TechforGood

Chinese Scientists Use Quantum Computers to Crack Military-Grade Encryption — A “Real and Substantial Threat” to RSA and AES Key Insights: • Chinese researchers claim to have conducted a successful quantum attack on widely used cryptographic algorithms, including RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). • The attack leveraged a D-Wave quantum computer using quantum annealing techniques to compromise substitution–permutation network (SPN) cryptographic algorithms. • These encryption standards are widely used in banking, military communications, and global cybersecurity systems, highlighting the severity of the threat. Technical Breakdown of the Attack: • The research paper, titled Quantum Annealing Public Key Cryptographic Attack Algorithm Based on D-Wave Advantage, describes two approaches utilizing quantum annealing algorithms. • The first approach relies entirely on the D-Wave Advantage quantum computer, which was programmed to solve an optimization problem and an exponential space search problem simultaneously. • These problems were mapped onto the Ising model, a mathematical model used in quantum annealing to optimize large, complex systems. • The algorithm successfully demonstrated vulnerabilities in the RSA encryption scheme, which relies on the computational difficulty of prime factorization for security. Why This Matters: • Cryptographic Vulnerability: RSA and AES encryption underpin global secure communications, digital banking, and government systems. • Quantum Threat Realized: While quantum computing’s threat to cryptography has long been theorized, this study marks a practical demonstration of such an attack, signaling that real-world vulnerabilities may arrive sooner than expected. • Immediate Risk: If validated, this breakthrough could undermine current cryptographic infrastructures worldwide, necessitating a shift to quantum-resistant encryption protocols. Implications for Global Security: • Military and Government Communications: Sensitive data protected by RSA and AES could potentially be exposed to adversaries equipped with quantum computing capabilities. • Banking and Financial Systems: Encryption standards securing online banking, e-commerce, and financial transactions might no longer guarantee data integrity and confidentiality. • Quantum-Resistant Algorithms: This event underscores the urgency of adopting post-quantum cryptography—encryption systems designed to withstand quantum attacks. This breakthrough highlights the tangible risks posed by quantum computing to global cybersecurity. While the immediate applicability of the attack remains under scrutiny, the study serves as a stark reminder that the era of quantum threats to classical encryption is no longer a distant concern but an emerging reality.

Reading A Practitioner’s Guide to Post-Quantum Cryptography from the Cloud Security Alliance made me pause. It highlights something many organizations still underestimate very often: modern cryptography was not designed for a future with cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs). This threat is also not theoretical. The risk comes from Store Now, Decrypt Later attacks, where encrypted data can be harvested today and broken once quantum capabilities mature. Time, not just technology, becomes the critical risk factor. Key highlights from the guide • Shor’s and Grover’s quantum algorithms threaten most public-key cryptography in use today, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and elliptic-curve algorithms • CRQCs may emerge by the early 2030s, putting long-term-value data at risk even if systems are secure today • Data confidentiality and integrity are both impacted by Store Now, Decrypt Later attacks • NIST published post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 (FIPS-203, FIPS-204, FIPS-205), but enterprise adoption will take time and investment • Risk assessment must begin by identifying which data assets still hold value at “Q-Day,” not by blanket cryptographic replacement Who should take note • Security leaders responsible for long-term data protection strategies • Architects managing encryption for data at rest, data in transit, and non-repudiation • Compliance and governance teams evaluating regulatory and sector-specific quantum readiness requirements • Engineering teams responsible for cryptographic libraries, TLS, VPNs, KMS, and certificate management Why this matters Unlike most cyber threats, quantum risk is driven by time. Data intercepted today may be compromised years later. If enterprises wait until CRQCs arrive, it will already be too late for data with long-term value. At the same time, mitigation is costly, complex, and not yet fully supported by mainstream products. The path forward The guide emphasizes starting with disciplined risk assessment, identifying vulnerable cryptographic functions, and mapping technology components before committing to mitigation. Enterprises should periodically reassess risk, track technology maturity, and align mitigation efforts with CSA Cloud Controls Matrix guidance rather than rushing into premature or unnecessary changes.

✏️CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) has just published the report "Strengthening the EU transition to a quantum-safe world" This 125-page publication offers a comprehensive and very timely analysis of the global transition toward quantum-safety, highlighting key recommendations and identifying the hurdles that we, as a community, still need to overcome. Accross its 10 general recommendations and 16 additional sector-specific ones, two key aspects take a prominent role: 👉 Operational challenges of the transition, like establishing business-level priorities, building executive support, addressing the limited cryptographic talent issue, cryptographic homogeneization in products, and building cryptographic inventories based on priorities. 👉 Coordination and the role for regulators, identifying that the EU lacks a coherent, unified transition framework, the need to ensure alignment and coherence across roadmaps and the risks of a fragmented transition. Key conclusions on the later, aligned with previous statements from the Europol Quantum Safe Financial Forum and FS-ISAC, is that quantum-safety is already part of the EU's operational resilience compliance through the “state of the art” security principle embedded in GDPR, DORA, CRA and NIS2. However, there is a recognised need for further guidance that can be achieved through open collaboration between the public and private sector. Although the report focuses on the financial, public, and defence sectors, its main takeaways can easily be extended to other critical domains—transport, energy, healthcare, and many more. The principles are the same, and the urgency is the same. This report is an important step forward, and my hope is that the ideas it lays out help shape the conversations and, more importantly, the actions we need across the EU. A well-aligned and coordinated transition is essential if we want the whole ecosystem to move toward a new age where we manage cryptography in a more mature, proactive, and resilient way. Kudos to CEPS, lorenzo pupillo, Carolina Polito, Swann A. and Afonso Ferreira, PhD for achieving this milestone. https://lnkd.in/dpWJ86q2

👉 Recently, my work on #quantum #technology and its impacts on international security was published at SIPRI. Here, I would like to highlight my observations and recommendations. I would like to point out the main observations and recommendations, especially covering: 🔸High-resolution magnetic and gravity data sets will become strategic assets 🔸Quantum decryption capabilities may widen intelligence asymmetries between states with different levels of technological advancement 🔸The strategic impact of quantum will depend on its integration with other technologies, not on quantum systems alone 🔸Dual-use quantum development will accelerate and attempts to fully separate civilian and military pathways are unlikely to succeed 🔸National self-sufficiency in quantum technologies is unrealistic—international cooperation is necessary for resilience and innovation 🔸There is a growing need for dedicated institutions to assess the peace and security implications of quantum technologies 🔸Malicious or illicit use of quantum technologies by non-state actors is likely to emerge over time

The Quantum Security Imperative: Why Your 2025 Data Needs Protection Today If you’re still thinking quantum computing is a distant threat, you’ve already missed the window. Recent quantum security research from leading institutions emphasizes a critical reality: the “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” threat is widely assessed by governments as a credible ongoing risk. Nation-state adversaries are believed to be harvesting encrypted traffic at scale. Once Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computers arrive (estimated 2030-2035), Shor’s algorithm could retroactively decrypt previously harvested data. Mosca’s Theorem makes this concrete: If your data needs secrecy for 10 years, migration takes 5 years, and quantum arrives in 12 years, you’re already 3 years late. In healthcare, finance, and national security, that inequality has become a critical risk. The CASCADE Framework Applied: PEOPLE: Your teams need quantum literacy now. CISOs, architects, and developers must understand PQC implications. Start cross-functional quantum readiness teams today. DATA: Build your Cryptographic Bill of Materials. You can’t protect what you don’t inventory. Prioritize patient records, financial transactions, and trade secrets with 10+ years of confidentiality requirements. PROCESS: Implement crypto-agility as standard architecture. When algorithms break (like SIKE in 2022), you need to swap them without recompiling your stack. Embed PQC into procurement, development lifecycles, and vendor management. TECHNOLOGY: Deploy hybrid encryption now. Wrap data in both classical (ECC) and post-quantum (ML-KEM/Kyber) algorithms. NIST finalized FIPS 203, 204, and 205 in August 2024. Start piloting in non-production environments. BUSINESS: U.S. government directives, including NSM-10, mandate federal preparation and planning for PQC migration. Under GDPR and HIPAA, retroactive quantum decryption creates significant regulatory and liability risk. Board-level risk committees need PQC on the agenda now. The execution framework: Prevent (crypto-agility architecture, quantum-resistant algorithms, vendor PQC roadmaps), Detect (CBOM scanning, automated RSA/ECC discovery, traffic analysis), Recover (hybrid encryption, quantum-resistant backups, re-encryption strategies). Early PQC migration planning significantly reduces transition costs. In IoT-heavy industries (automotive, manufacturing, utilities), the cost of physical device replacement escalates exponentially with delay. The dual-track strategy: Offensive (pilot quantum computing for portfolio optimization, supply chain logistics, molecular simulation), Defensive (treat PQC migration as critical infrastructure). Bottom line: Quantum computing’s promise remains years away. The data-collection phase of the quantum threat is already active. What’s your organization’s crypto-agility roadmap? #QuantumComputing #Cybersecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #RiskManagement #CISO

Quantum computing is moving from "science fiction" to "business reality" faster than most predicted. Two recent papers have fundamentally shifted the timeline for when we need to care about Quantum-Safe security: 1️⃣ The "10,000 Qubits" Milestone: New research shows that we can execute Shor’s algorithm—the math that breaks today’s encryption—with far fewer resources than previously thought. By using reconfigurable atomic qubits, the hardware requirements for cracking RSA-2048 have dropped by nearly 20x. 2️⃣ The "9-Minute" Crypto Warning: Google’s latest whitepaper highlights a terrifying reality for digital assets. Under advanced quantum scenarios, the encryption protecting a cryptocurrency wallet could be cracked in under 10 minutes. This puts billions in "dormant" assets at immediate risk of "at-rest" attacks. The Bottom Line: The "Q-Day" window is shrinking. It’s no longer about if a quantum computer can break your encryption, but when your current migration timeline will run out. How do we respond? We can't just flip a switch on "Q-Day." For many organizations, becoming quantum safe is a multi-year journey. This is where Palo Alto Networks Quantum-Safe Security comes in. Instead of a manual, multi-year overhaul, we provide a path to Agentic Resilience: - Continuous Discovery: It automatically maps your "cryptographic bill of materials" (CBOM), identifying exactly where vulnerable RSA and ECC algorithms are hiding in your network. - Risk Prioritization: It correlates your encryption strength with business criticality, telling you exactly which high-value assets need to move to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) first. - Real-Time Remediation: For legacy systems that can’t be easily upgraded, a "Quantum-Safe Proxy" re-encrypts vulnerable traffic into post-quantum algorithms (like ML-KEM) at the network edge. The transition to a quantum-safe future is a marathon, but the starting gun has already fired. Learn how to take your first steps at the link in the comments.