Secure Authentication Protocols for Remote Access

🚀 New Preview Feature: Entra ID–Based RDP Login to Azure VMs (via Bastion!) Microsoft just introduced a major upgrade to remote administration in Azure — and it’s now available in public preview: You can now authenticate to Windows VMs over RDP using Microsoft Entra ID… directly through Azure Bastion. No local accounts. No passwords. No public IPs. No open port 3389. Just identity-based, Zero Trust–aligned access in the browser. This is a big shift in how secure VM access is done in Azure. --- 🆕 What’s new in this preview? Azure Bastion now supports Microsoft Entra ID authentication for RDP sessions. When the required roles and the AADLoginForWindows extension are in place: Virtual Machine Administrator Login Virtual Machine User Login …Entra ID becomes the default authentication method in Bastion. This unlocks: ✔️ True identity-based RDP access ✔️ Enforcement of Conditional Access policies ✔️ Consistent sign-in experience across Azure resources ✔️ Strong alignment with Zero Trust principles --- 🔐 Why this matters Traditional RDP relies on local accounts or domain credentials and typically requires exposed ports or jump hosts. With this preview: RDP runs over port 443 through Bastion VMs stay fully isolated from the internet No client tools or agents are required Access is managed entirely through Entra ID This is the direction secure cloud management is headed. --- 🛠 What you need to enable it To use the new Entra ID RDP login: A Bastion host deployed in the VM’s VNet (Standard SKU or higher for custom ports) A Windows VM in that VNet The AADLoginForWindows extension enabled One of the required Entra roles assigned Reader permissions on VM, NIC, VNet, and Bastion --- ▶️ How to connect 1. Open your VM in the Azure Portal 2. Select Connect → Bastion 3. Choose RDP + Microsoft Entra ID (Preview) 4. Click Connect — your session launches instantly in the browser No open RDP port. No jump box. No password prompts. Just clean, secure, identity-driven access. --- If you haven’t tested this preview yet, it’s absolutely worth trying. This feature pushes Azure VM administration even further toward a passwordless, Zero Trust, identity-first model — and that’s a win for every cloud environment. #MicrosoftEntra #AzureBastion #AzureSecurity #RDP #ZeroTrust #CloudAdministration #Azure #AVD

𝗜𝗖𝗦 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹: 𝗞𝗲𝗲𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗖𝘆𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝗧𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘀 𝗢𝘂𝘁 𝟯:𝟬𝟬 𝗮.𝗺. 𝗶𝗻 𝗮𝗻 𝗲𝗻𝗲𝗿𝗴𝘆 𝗽𝗹𝗮𝗻𝘁: An operator sees the cursor moving—on its own. In 2021, hackers actually took control of a Florida water plant, nearly poisoning the water. Why? Shared passwords and open remote access. Access control in Industrial Control Systems (ICS) isn’t just IT hygiene—it’s a frontline defense. Unlike IT, ICS must balance security vs. uptime, making access control complex. 𝗞𝗲𝘆 𝗖𝗵𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀 𝗶𝗻 𝗜𝗖𝗦 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹 ❌ Default & Shared Credentials – Many OT devices still use factory-set or hardcoded passwords. ❌ Overprivileged Accounts – Admins using the same account for both daily tasks & critical operations. ❌ Uncontrolled Remote Access – Unrestricted RDP, TeamViewer, or VPN access directly into OT. ❌ Lack of Continuous Audits – Old user accounts lingering long after employees leave. 𝗣𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝗹 𝗦𝗼𝗹𝘂𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀 (Aligned with IEC 62443) ✏️ Kill Default Credentials – Change all default passwords before deployment. Use compensating controls if you can’t. ✏️ Unique, Least-Privilege Accounts – No shared logins. Admins should have separate work and privileged accounts. ✏️ Secure Remote Access – Jump servers, MFA, and firewalls between IT & OT. No direct access to controllers. ✏️ Regular Audits & Offboarding – Disable accounts immediately when employees or contractors leave. 𝙍𝙚𝙘𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙇𝙚𝙨𝙨𝙤𝙣: The Florida water plant breach could have been prevented with MFA, segmented access, and unique passwords. Simple steps can block attackers from turning small mistakes into disasters. ICS security is about access—who gets in, what they can do, and when they’re removed. Every login should tell a secure story. #ICS #CyberSecurity #IEC62443 #AccessControl #OTSecurity

📢 𝗠𝗶𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁 𝗘𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮 is extending 𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘆‑𝗰𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗰 𝗭𝗲𝗿𝗼 𝗧𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁 access controls directly to the core of 𝗼𝗻‑𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗲 infrastructure: 𝗔𝗰𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲 𝗗𝗶𝗿𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿𝘆 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗿𝘀. 🆔 🔒 The new 𝗠𝗶𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝗼𝗳𝘁 𝗘𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗮 𝗣𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗗𝗼𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗻 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗹𝗹𝗲𝗿𝘀 is now in 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝗰 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗲𝘄, enabling organizations to apply 𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗱𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 and 𝗺𝘂𝗹𝘁𝗶‑𝗳𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗼𝗿 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 (𝗠𝗙𝗔) to internal resources authenticating via 𝗞𝗲𝗿𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗼𝘀. 🛡️ 🛠️ By deploying a lightweight 𝗣𝗿𝗶𝘃𝗮𝘁𝗲 𝗔𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝘀𝗲𝗻𝘀𝗼𝗿 on domain controllers, organizations can intercept 𝗞𝗲𝗿𝗯𝗲𝗿𝗼𝘀 authentication and enforce 𝗺𝗼𝗱𝗲𝗿𝗻 𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝘀 — even for protocols that don’t natively support them — eliminating 𝗶𝗺𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗶𝘁 𝘁𝗿𝘂𝘀𝘁 inside the network perimeter. 🛡️ 🏢 This ensures consistent protection across 𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗼𝘁𝗲, 𝗼𝗻‑𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗲𝘀, and 𝗵𝘆𝗯𝗿𝗶𝗱 environments, while keeping 𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰 local for performance and sending 𝗮𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝘁𝗿𝗮𝗳𝗳𝗶𝗰 to Entra for 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝘆 𝗲𝘃𝗮𝗹𝘂𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻. 📡 🧩 This capability also unlocks 𝗜𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗧𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁 𝗗𝗲𝘁𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝗻𝘀𝗲 (𝗜𝗧𝗗𝗥) for hybrid users, verifying every 𝗮𝗰𝗰𝗲𝘀𝘀 𝗿𝗲𝗾𝘂𝗲𝘀𝘁, blocking 𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗮𝗹 𝗺𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁, and enforcing 𝗠𝗙𝗔 at the domain controller layer for sensitive on‑premises 𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀. 🕵️♂️ 📊 Admins can define 𝗦𝗣𝗡‑𝗹𝗲𝘃𝗲𝗹 𝗽𝗼𝗹𝗶𝗰𝗶𝗲𝘀 — for example, requiring MFA for `cifs/*` file shares, enabling compliant device access to `MSSQL/*` servers, or applying step‑up authentication for critical 𝗥𝗗𝗣 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗲𝗿𝘀. 📂 ✅ Built‑in flexibility supports phased rollouts with 𝗔𝘂𝗱𝗶𝘁 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗲, 𝗦𝗣𝗡 𝗘𝘅𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀, 𝗨𝗻𝗺𝗮𝗻𝗮𝗴𝗲𝗱 𝗗𝗲𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 𝗕𝗹𝗼𝗰𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴, and 𝗕𝗿𝗲𝗮𝗸 𝗚𝗹𝗮𝘀𝘀 𝗠𝗼𝗱𝗲 for emergencies — ensuring 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 without disrupting 𝗼𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀. 🧯 📌 This approach delivers 𝗼𝗻‑𝗽𝗿𝗲𝗺𝗶𝘀𝗲𝘀 𝗠𝗙𝗔 𝗲𝗻𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗰𝗲𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 without third‑party 𝗵𝗮𝗿𝗱𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗲 or complex 𝗻𝗲𝘁𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 𝗰𝗵𝗮𝗻𝗴𝗲𝘀, modernizing 𝘀𝗲𝗰𝘂𝗿𝗶𝘁𝘆 for 𝗵𝘆𝗯𝗿𝗶𝗱 𝘄𝗼𝗿𝗸 while integrating seamlessly with existing 𝗶𝗱𝗲𝗻𝘁𝗶𝘁𝘆 𝗶𝗻𝗳𝗿𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲. 🔗 👉 Discover how to start testing today: https://lnkd.in/ea3hMGgH 🔗 Microsoft Security #Cybersecurity #ZeroTrust #MicrosoftEntra #IdentitySecurity #ConditionalAccess #MFA #ITDR #NetworkSecurity #AccessControl #Kerberos #ActiveDirectory #ZTNA #SecurityServiceEdge #IdentityProtection | Ashish Jain, Yann Duchenne, Franck Heilmann

⚡ SSH Penetration Testing – High-Level Awareness & Assessment Guide SSH is the primary remote management protocol for servers. Ethical SSH testing verifies authentication, configuration, and logging to reduce remote compromise risk — always in authorized lab or engagement scopes. 💡 High-level Testing Areas: ▪️Recon & Discovery — Identify exposed SSH endpoints and service versions. ▪️Authentication Assessment — Check for weak/default credentials, key management, and password auth vs. key-only policies. ▪️Configuration Review — Verify SSH protocol version, root login settings, idle timeouts, and allowed ciphers/kex. ▪️Access Controls — Audit authorized keys, user privileges, sudo policies, and account hygiene. ▪️Brute-force & Rate-limit Checks (lab only) — Validate protection against automated login attempts and make sure lockouts/rate limits exist. ▪️Logging & Monitoring — Ensure detailed auth logs, alerting on failed logins, and integration with SIEM/EDR. ▪️Posture Hardening — Enforce key rotation, disable obsolete ciphers, use bastion hosts/jump boxes, and apply network filters. ▪️Recovery & Remediation — Rotate compromised credentials, revoke keys, and perform root-cause analysis. 🛡️ Defensive Checklist (quick): ▫️Enforce key-based auth + disable password auth where possible. ▫️Disable root login; apply least-privilege accounts. ▫️Use hardened ciphers and up-to-date OpenSSH. ▫️Implement MFA for privileged access / use SSH certificates. ▫️Rate-limit/lockout and centralize logs to SIEM. ▫️Restrict access by IP/network segmentation and bastion hosts. ⚠️ Disclaimer: For educational & authorized use only. Perform SSH testing only on systems you own or have explicit written permission to assess. Unauthorized testing is illegal and unethical. #SSH #PenTesting #InfoSec #CyberSecurity #RemoteAccess #ServerSecurity #Hardening #BlueTeam #EthicalHacking

Collecting API keys, tokens, and credentials through MCP has presented significant security and UX challenges. Our customers aren’t strangers to these challenges. You have to either trust the client with sensitive credentials or build complex, custom authorization logic from scratch. The new MCP update includes URL mode elicitation. It’s a standardized, secure alternative that enables MCP servers to direct users to a dedicated browser-based authentication like OAuth. Users authenticate in a secure context, and the resulting credentials are handled directly by the server. The big deal? ◾ No need to authorize every service upfront. You'll be prompted the moment an action actually needs access. ◾ Authorize directly with each service. The MCP client never sees or stores your credentials. Authentication happens between you and the service itself. This change meaningfully expands the range of scenarios the protocol can support, including: ① Secure credential collection: API keys and passwords no longer pass through the client. ② External OAuth flows: Servers can directly obtain third-party authorization without token passthrough. ③ Payment processing: PCI-compliant financial interactions can occur securely in the browser and outside the client environment. Beyond these scenarios, URL Elicitation introduces several important operational and security guarantees: → URL-based elicitations follow an asynchronous pattern. After the user completes the out-of-band flow, servers send an elicitation/complete notification identifying the original request, while clients are expected to handle cases where the flow is abandoned. → The specification enforces strong security constraints. Only HTTPS URLs are permitted, clients must validate URLs to prevent SSRF risks, and clients are required to clearly display the target domain before redirecting users. → This mechanism does not replace MCP’s core authorization model. Instead, it provides a dedicated pathway for servers to acquire third-party credentials or perform sensitive authorization steps without exposing them to the client. The server simply provides a URL, the client surfaces it, and upon completion the server receives the necessary tokens directly. It's a secure, simple, and standardized solution to a tricky problem.

FIDO2 is the de-facto standard for passwordless and 2FA authentication. FIDO2 relies on the Client-to-Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) to secure communications between clients (e.g., web browsers) and authenticators (e.g., USB dongles). In this stream, we'll perform a security assessment of CTAP and its Authenticator API. This API is a critical protocol-level attack surface that handles credentials and authenticator settings. We'll investigate the standard FIDO2 setup (credentials stored by the relying party) and the most secure setup, where credentials are stored on the authenticator, protected from data breaches. We find that FIDO2 security mechanisms still rely on phishable mechanisms (i.e., PIN) and unclear security boundaries (e.g., trusting unauthenticated clients). We'll introduce eleven CTRAPS attacks grouped into two novel classes: Client Impersonation and API Confusion. These attacks exploit CTAP vulnerabilities to wipe credentials, perform unauthorized factory resets, and track users. Our open-source toolkit implements the attacks on two Android apps, an Electron app, and a Proxmark3 script, supporting the USB HID and NFC transports. In our demos, we'll show how to use our CTRAPS toolkit to exploit popular authenticators, like YubiKeys, and relying parties, like Microsoft and Apple.

When Multifactor Authentication (MFA) Isn't Enough Many of us have been required to add more complex passwords in recent years, and then we were forced to use multifactor to get into our accounts. This all makes sense as it requires an additional step to keep our account from being taken over. We should no longer be using anything other than an authentication app such as those from Google and Microsoft because SMS texting is no longer considered secure. However, it is increasingly becoming clear that MFA isn't going to be enough in a Microsoft Active Directory or Entra ID world. It can give us a false sense of security. Phishing emails are constantly compromising our staff by having them click on links that cause their computers to be taken over. There is a tool you can use in your arsenal that can keep the bad guys away and its called Conditional Access (CA). CA is part of Azure and allows sysadmins to create policies to only allowed registered and compliant devices to access your resources such as computers and servers. A hacker outside your network is neither. You can also setup required admin consent for enterprise applications to be installed. This can keep hackers out and unable to install their malware and remote access. CA is easy to setup and has lots of options. I suggest you use it in test mode or on test users to make sure it will do as you require and then deploy it company wide. For mobile devices, you can add protection using Intune as well. I do realize these all require an additional premium license, but if you are going to live in the Cloud world, you'll need to protect your organization. Zero Trust should be your new mantra. Professor Robert McMillen https://lnkd.in/gsQgE2Qh #LinkedInLearning @Ascend Education No AI was hurt or used in the making of this article.

Enable Passwordless Authentication with FIDO2 Security Key for Remote Desktop Connection 🔐 🔐 Go Passwordless with FIDO2 for RDP Use FIDO2 security keys to enable secure, passwordless Remote Desktop access—aligned with Zero Trust principles. 🖥️ Remote Desktop Connection Configuration ▪️ Launch mstsc.exe, go to Advanced tab ▪️Under User Authentication, select: “Use a web account to sign in” ▪️Enter remote device name and Entra ID credentials ▪️Choose Security Key at prompt ▪️Insert key, enter PIN, touch to complete authentication ▪️Approve RDP consent prompt → session starts 🔁 Hybrid Entra ID-Joined Devices ▪️ Create an AzureADKerberos RODC object in Entra ID (not linked to on-prem AD) ▪️ Use PowerShell to register it and enable Kerberos authentication ▪️ Verify object in Active Directory Users and Computers ▪️ Follow the same RDP steps as Entra ID-joined devices 🧾 Conditional Access for RDP Security ▪️ In Entra ID Portal → Security > Conditional Access ▪️Assign users/groups, choose Microsoft Remote Desktop app ▪️Under Grant, require Phishing-resistant authentication (FIDO2) ▪️Save and enable policy ⚠️ Note for Hybrid Join ▪️Avoid using domain admin or high-privilege AD accounts to log in—partial TGT won’t be issued. 📌 Read More : https://lnkd.in/gAa3WjSi

Firewall Authentication using Fortinet's🛡⚔️ FortiGate and covers the following topics: 1. Overview of Firewall Authentication Importance of authentication in firewalls. Basic concepts of user and group-based authentication. 2. Methods of Authentication in FortiGate Local Password Authentication. Server-Based Password Authentication: LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol). RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service). Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): FortiToken (hardware and software tokens). 3. Configuring Authentication Configuring LDAP and RADIUS servers. Assigning user groups to firewall policies. Testing authentication using CLI tools. 4. Authentication Techniques Active Authentication: Prompts users for credentials. Passive Authentication: Uses Single Sign-On (SSO) for seamless authentication. 5. Special Features and Configuration Captive Portals for web-based user authentication. Authentication timeouts for security and resource management. Monitoring authenticated users via the firewall interface. 6. Practical Exercises Configuring LDAP and RADIUS servers. Assigning user groups to policies and testing their functionality. Here are some hashtags derived from the topics in your document, without numbering: #FirewallAuthentication #FortinetSecurity #FortiGateConfiguration #NetworkSecurity #LDAPIntegration #RADIUSAuthentication #TwoFactorAuthentication #FortiToken #CaptivePortal #UserAuthentication #MFA #Cybersecurity #ActiveAuthentication #PassiveAuthentication #AuthenticationTimeout #SecureNetworking

Palo Alto Firewall Series #Post 17 IPSEC VPN What is an IPSEC VPN? IPSEC (Internet Protocol Security) VPN creates a secure encrypted tunnel between two sites over the internet. It provides: Confidentiality (Encryption – AES) Integrity (SHA) Authentication (PSK / Certificate) Anti-Replay protection Used for: Site-to-Site connectivity Branch ↔ HQ communication Cloud ↔ On-Prem connectivity REAL-WORLD SCENARIO Branch Office LAN: 10.10.X.X Public IP: 1.1.X.X Head Office LAN: 10.20.X.X Public IP: 2.2.X.X Goal: Allow traffic between 10.10.X.X ↔ 10.20.X.X securely. IPSEC PHASES (Understand Before Config) 🔹 Phase 1 – IKE SA (Tunnel Negotiation) Encryption (AES-256) Hash (SHA256) DH Group (14) Authentication (Pre-Shared Key) Lifetime (8 hours default) 🔹 Phase 2 – IPSEC SA (Data Protection) Encryption PFS Proxy IDs (Important!) Lifetime (1 hour default) STEP-BY-STEP CONFIGURATION (Palo Alto) ✅ STEP 1 – Create IKE Crypto Profile Network → Network Profiles → IKE Crypto Set: Version: IKEv2 (recommended) Encryption: AES-256 Authentication: SHA256 DH Group: 14 Lifetime: 8 Hours ✅ STEP 2 – Create IPSEC Crypto Profile Network → Network Profiles → IPSEC Crypto Set: ESP Encryption: AES-256 Authentication: SHA256 PFS: Group 14 Lifetime: 3600 seconds ✅ STEP 3 – Create Tunnel Interface Network → Interfaces → Tunnel Create tunnel.1 Assign Virtual Router Assign Zone (VPN-Zone) Give IP (optional if policy-based not required) ✅ STEP 4 – Create IKE Gateway Network → IKE Gateways Set: Version: IKEv2 Interface: WAN interface Local IP: 1.1.X.X Peer IP: 2.2.X.X Authentication: Pre-Shared Key Select IKE Crypto Profile ✅ STEP 5 – Create IPSEC Tunnel Network → IPSEC Tunnels Select Tunnel Interface Attach IKE Gateway Attach IPSEC Crypto Profile 🔥 Important – Proxy IDs Local: 10.10.X.X Remote: 10.20.X.X (If mismatched → Phase 2 fails) ✅ STEP 6 – Add Static Route Destination: 10.20.X.X Next Hop: tunnel.1 ✅ STEP 7 – Security Policy Allow: Source Zone → VPN-Zone Destination Zone → LAN Application → any (or restrict) 🔍 CLI VERIFICATION COMMANDS Check IKE SA: show vpn ike-sa Check IPSEC SA: show vpn ipsec-sa Clear Tunnel: clear vpn ike-sa gateway <name> Enable Debug: debug ike global on debug less mp-log ikemgr.log #CyberSecurity #NetworkSecurity #Firewall #NetworkSegmentation #ZeroTrust #SecurityArchitecture #NetworkEngineering #SecurityEngineer