Preparing For Protests

Stories of protests fill the papers: riots in Ferguson, Baltimore, and Berkeley; disruptions at airports coast to coast; pipeline construction site blockades and sabotage; and out-of-control town hall meetings and campus speeches. Less trumpeted are the protests that fizzled or that were kept calm through smart security planning. What makes the difference between a protest that boils over into violence and major disruption and a protest that is steered, subtly or boldly, toward a peaceful outcome? What is a security director facing an imminent protest to do?

Why Protest Management Matters

Some protests are peaceful, while others involve violence against persons, destruction of property, and intimidation. Even peaceful protests may be illegal when conducted in restricted spaces, such as airports and other governmental high-security locations. A security director may not be able to determine in advance whether a protest will be peaceful or legal. Moreover, it is not his or her task to stop people from protesting. Therefore, when a company is targeted by protesters or is expected to be in their path, the security director should focus on traditional security concerns: protecting the company’s people, property, information, and reputation.

In a protest or riot situation, the protective effort takes on special urgency and requires different methods than those employed during normal times. Much is at stake. Protests and riots are unstable, high-tension events that can boil over into serious, harsh outcomes, such as loss of life, severe personal injuries, major property damage, and complete stoppage of legitimate business activities.

The good news is that various security approaches have already been tried and tested in previous protest events. Experience shows that some situations call for a high-visibility security profile designed to discourage protesters from harming the company’s employees and property. In other types of protests, a low-key, low-visibility approach works better, in effect taking the wind out of the protesters’ sails. In all cases, a disciplined, documented approach leads to the best outcomes (on-site or in court later).

It may be hard to convince senior management to spend money on planning and preparation if a protest does not seem imminent. However, showing photos and videos (readily available online) of recent protests that got out of control may clarify the ramifications of being unprepared. Images of burning buildings, looters, broken windows, and injured people on stretchers—perhaps with a company’s marquee sign in the background—may provide a reminder of what can happen when inadequate precautions are taken.

Concepts for Calming Conflicts

Security is not law enforcement. The goal is not to arrest protesters but to prevent problems. To address an upcoming protest or riot, it is essential first to assess the threat based on intelligence collection. After gaining an understanding of the threat, the security director can choose a protective approach that best fits the situation, applying various concepts designed to calm the event and prevent harm.

Intelligence gathering. To prepare to protect a facility and keep a protest from spiraling out of control, it is essential to have some idea what to expect. Gaining that knowledge, even imperfectly, requires intelligence collection. Several approaches are available. A large company with a well-developed security department may have enough skilled personnel to perform its own intel gathering. A smaller security department or a company facing an especially aggressive or well-organized threat may need outside help. In that case, it may be appropriate to contract with a risk assessment firm or a firm that specializes in addressing protests and riots.

Whoever performs the intelligence collection should attempt to learn as much as possible about the adversary, including its prior tactics and level of aggression. It makes sense to conduct general Internet searches, look at social media, interview law enforcement personnel, and speak with other companies that have faced the group (or similar groups) in the past. Youtube and protest group websites may feature videos of past incidents, which can be viewed to understand the adversary’s strategies and practices in the hope of countering them.

In some cases, invisible countersurveillance may be appropriate. For example, in the run-up to a major international economic summit, the author’s security firm determined that a famous, well-organized activist group wanted to embarrass a company that was headquartered in the city. To protect that company, we put its facility under covert surveillance before the summit. The goal was to detect odd behavior, such as a car passing by the site multiple times (perhaps doing advance work for protesters) or someone walking past the site and taking pictures or notes (possibly for planning a protest gathering). We also tried to think like the protesters and, trying not to be noticed, looked around to determine the best places for protesters to hang banners. We then took steps to make those locations unavailable.

Surveillance and countersurveillance are not foolproof. Dedicated, hard-core protesters are aware of surveillance techniques and have published guides for detecting and eluding them.

Selection of overall approach. Intelligence collection should lead to some understanding of the adversary, which in turn should suggest an overall approach or tenor to adopt in protecting the site. In all cases, the goal is to win without fighting, but finesse is required. In some cases, a high-visibility, high-security, high-deterrence approach is appropriate. If the protesters are known to be violent or the site is especially vulnerable, a strong approach may be called for. How often does one see antinuclear or environmental protesters attacking nuclear facilities that are guarded by highly trained, black-clad officers with automatic weapons? In many corporate settings, by contrast, a lower-profile, less-provocative approach is appropriate as a way to set expectations for peaceful behavior without doing anything to inflame the protesters.

Unpredictability. Potential conflicts may also be kept calm through unpredictability. The company should generally not broadcast its security plans but should aim to keep protesters guessing. That way, they will not know what types of security measures to combat. For example, if there is a risk of insider collusion with the protest, the company can send workers home early, without any advance notice, to reduce opportunities for sabotage.

Attitude of security staff. Calm can also be preserved through disciplined behavior by security staff during the protest. It is best for them not to engage in arguments with protesters or return any abusive language. Protesters like to goad security officers into inappropriate responses. Officers should control any urge to confront the protesters and instead calmly use deflection and redirection. It is best to say something like, “I hear and understand what you are saying, but….” Insulting protesters emboldens and empowers them, whereas keeping cool strengthens an officer’s control over the situation and increases safety.

Vulnerability reduction. Certain measures can in effect make the company a smaller target. Sending employees home before a protest not only removes them from risk but also puts their personal vehicles out of harm’s way (against keying or other vandalism). Removing loose items from the property deprives protesters of projectiles. Removing or locking trash receptacles decreases locations where protesters could plant bombs or set fires. Moving company trucks inside the security perimeter prevents vandalism against those vehicles, and locking up propane and oil tanks on-site keeps protesters from igniting those items.

Executing the Work

If the intelligence-based risk assessment suggests a significant risk that a protest or other disruption may affect the site, the next steps are (1) to assess the site’s physical security strengths and vulnerabilities and (2) to develop a security plan that addresses the following:

•       major policy decisions

•       support documentation

•       security staffing and supervision

•       communication and training

•       equipment, materials, and services

•       procedures

•       other issues

The key is to plan ahead. Mobilizing a security response may not be needed, but if it is, it will be much more difficult, or impossible, if it has not been carefully planned. A detailed plan is needed regardless of whether the company itself or an outside security firm will be providing security during the incident.

Assessment of site strengths and vulnerabilities. Certain characteristics of a site tend to make it more or less vulnerable during a protest or riot, and certain existing security capabilities may be especially relevant during an incident. Taking stock of the site’s strengths and vulnerabilities makes it possible to identify gaps that may need to be filled before the incident. Site strengths might include a high or isolated position, perimeter barriers, building access control, security lighting, employee photo IDs, security video cameras, intrusion alarms, company vehicle identification and controls, fire protection, emergency plans, and a security officer force. Vulnerabilities might include a low position, a lack of setback from the street, multiple routes in and out, and a location that is close to a riot’s point of origin.

Having completed the assessment, the company will have a better idea of what additional security measures are necessary to protect the site during the incident. For example, it might opt to strengthen key controls; add caller ID functionality; establish an outer perimeter with a temporary chain link fence (featuring an outrigger on top and a tension bar on the bottom); increase protection of hazardous material areas; reposition security cameras; and trim foliage that could provide hiding places or help intruders scale fences.

Major policy decisions. The security director will likely need to work with senior management to make important policy decisions that will shape security operations during the incident. Issues to address include whether the business will continue to operate during the incident, what the security posture will be (high or low visibility), how best to collaborate with local law enforcement, how to document illegal behavior by protesters (still photography, video, written incident reports, etc.), how to meet legal obligations, how to protect the corporate reputation, who will speak to the media, and who will make policy decisions regarding unexpected issues that arise during the protest or riot.

Support documentation. Protests and riots can present chaotic conditions that make decision making difficult and that may have legal ramifications. For both reasons, a variety of support documents are needed. For example, the security effort may require a list of employees and contractors authorized to enter the site during the incident; detailed emergency and contingency plans; written rules on access control during the incident; a list of on-site hazardous material (with specific locations and material safety data sheets for emergency responders); detailed external and internal maps of the facility for fire and police units in case of a fire, hostage taking, or other emergency; a list of fire extinguishers by type and location; and forms for reporting violence and other crimes that occur during the incident.

Security staffing and supervision. The plan should specify required security staffing levels, security officer posts (fixed and roving), task assignments, shift schedules, supervision responsibilities, command center arrangements, and evidence management procedures.

Communication and training. Several communication elements must be part of the overall security plan. For example, the company needs a way to notify employees if an incident is under way or about to begin, as well as whether they should report to work and whom they can contact for more information. It is also essential to establish communication channels with local law enforcement so the company will be informed of impending risks. In addition, the company may choose to contact distributors, customers, and vendors regarding whether business will continue during a protest or riot.

If the company’s usual security officers will be responsible for security during the incident, they will need training on how to act during the disturbance. Nonsecurity employees, too, will need training on how they should conduct themselves and what to do if they show up to work one day and encounter a demonstration. They will need to know whether and how to enter the work site. Sample advice is as follows:

•       Carry a cell phone.

•       Consider carpooling for moral support and to reduce the number of cars that must enter the site.

•       When leaving home for work, prepare yourself mentally for being stopped or jeered by protesters.

•       Try to approach the site in such a way that you will enter by making a right turn and will not have to block traffic. As you approach, watch for directions from law enforcement or security officers.

•       Keep vehicle doors locked and windows up. Drive very slowly as you approach protesters. Be prepared to stop quickly if one steps in front of you to try to get your vehicle to touch him.

•       Do not shout taunts or profanities at protesters, no matter what they say or do to you.

•       If you they block you, stay as long as it is safe (longer delays are more actionable in court). If you have to leave, do not go home but proceed to a place where you can safely phone the company’s security team. Tell them what happened and ask for transportation assistance.

•       If your vehicle is damaged while entering the site, report it to a security officer as soon as you are safely inside. If your vehicle is damaged while leaving, drive to a safe place and report the incident to security right away.

Equipment, materials, and services. Large-scale disturbances create a need for more and different security equipment, materials, and services than usual. The plan should address the need for visible marking of property lines to deter trespassing; “No Trespassing” signs on all property lines; ID badges for special service providers during the incident; emergency medical supplies; fire and HAZMAT response equipment; additional lighting in critical areas; temporary “No Parking” signs where needed; possible changes to the existing alarm system and security cameras; additional still and video cameras, along with mounting equipment; and food and sleeping arrangements if security personnel will be required to stay on-site for long periods.

Procedures. In addition to procedures specified under “Security staffing and supervision,” the plan should strictly require the wearing of ID badges, encourage all employees to report security concerns and protester offenses and specify how they should do so, and clarify any changes to access hours and locations.

Other issues. These include legal concerns, protester violence, collaboration, ongoing surveillance, and specialized help.

Legal concerns. Managers should make sure they understand the company’s rights as well as legal restrictions. Missteps can lead to legal problems and reputational damage. In particular, it is important to check local and state ordinances pertaining to photos, video, and audio recording.

Protester violence. Management must also consider how it wishes to respond to protester violence, property destruction, and threats. In some cases, companies opt to focus on collecting evidence of illegal behavior instead of acting forcefully to stop it. The idea is that it is easier and better to win in the courts instead of on the street during a tumultuous situation. Some companies offer rewards for information leading to the arrest and conviction of persons who committed crimes against them.

Collaboration. The plan should assign staff to establish liaison and cooperative relationships with law enforcement, fire, medical, governmental, and other agencies. It may be useful to engage in joint training with those agencies and to coordinate response protocols in advance.

Ongoing surveillance. The plan should call for continuing the types of surveillance and countersurveillance performed in the initial risk assessment. The goal is to be able to anticipate new actions and tactics even during the incident.

Specialized help. Many companies look for outside help when a protest or riot is looming. Security needs will be extra high, so extra staff will likely be required. Also, because such events are rare, the usual proprietary or contract security officers are unlikely to have the specialized skills, knowledge, and experience needed. They may not be prepared to deal with large, abusive crowds or understand the relevant legal issues or risks to the company’s reputation.

Some security firms specialize in helping companies protect themselves during protests, riots, and similar incidents. They can perform intelligence gathering and risk assessment; help draft the security plan; provide security officers with relevant training and experience; supply specialized equipment and services (e.g., cameras, temporary barriers, portable fencing, on-site lodging, bulletproof transportation, nonlethal weapons, and sophisticated surveillance); perform effective field command in high-stress situations; and be on alert 24/7 to respond as needed. If a company opts to work with such a firm, it should look for one that has a high level of insurance coverage (e.g., $10 million) and that is licensed in the state where the work will be done (rather than working under the license of another firm, which may not have sufficient insurance).

Custom Techniques for Different Settings

The preceding recommendations apply to most episodes of protests, riots, and other major disturbances. The following are some specialized suggestions for protection in particular settings.

Full-scale riots. During a riot, a high-level, clearly visible deterrent posture to protect life and property is usually most effective. If people are moving through a city in large numbers, burning cars and buildings and looting stores, a low-key approach to security—such as clearly marked property lines and “No Trespassing” signs—will likely fail.

If a company’s intelligence effort suggests that a riot may follow an upcoming event (such as a court decision or a campus speech to which some people object) or a recent event (such as a shooting by police), the company should use high-profile security measures to set an expectation, namely that rioters should move on and not attack the company’s facility. The author’s firm was tasked with protecting industrial facilities during the 2015 Baltimore riots. Our approach was to deter attacks (not combat them) by prominently deploying security officers and cameras, much as a home security sign is designed to encourage burglars to move along to an easier target.

A different technique was required when we were tasked with protecting television news crews as they went about the city. Because rioters were all around and our protectees were a soft target, we kept a low profile, standing only an arm’s length away from reporters, watching the surroundings carefully, and standing ready to carry out our evacuation plan.

Disruptions (usually nonviolent) at town hall meetings and annual shareholder meetings. Here the best approach is to send a positive message that event hosts expect the meeting to proceed in an orderly fashion. One approach is to mount temporary cameras on tripods or on walls (for example, placing one in each corner of the room). Mounting them makes them seem less aggressive than having a person hold each camera and point it at attendees. Large video monitors should be placed around the room, clearly showing participants that they are on camera, and a single local law enforcement officer should be visible on-site. The idea is to encourage peaceful behavior. Experience shows that difficult or disruptive people will say no the first or second time they are asked to behave, but if the request is made properly, somewhere around the third or fourth time most people will comply.

Mass protests, occupation, and property damage at construction projects and corporate headquarters. Some special techniques for these situations (like protests against the Dakota Access Pipeline and the Atlantic Coast Pipeline) include using high locations for photography, perhaps capturing multiple angles from a roof; reinforcing employee training on safe practices for driving to and from the site (especially what to do if followed when leaving); clearly marking property lines; reminding employees to report threats against them and rumors of upcoming illegal behavior to security; and posting “No Trespassing” signs and taking video of the act of posting (as signs may be torn down). Some companies install heavy stone “No Trespassing” markers, similar to tombstones, that cannot easily be removed.

Sometimes the best approach is to remove protesters’ targets, in effect taking the wind out of their sails. This approach can minimize risk for all concerned. The author’s firm was asked to protect a corporate headquarters where a large-scale labor protest was expected. We learned that only 10-15 police officers would be available to help us deal with more than 1,000 protesters. To reduce opportunities for trouble, we arranged for the company to send all its headquarters staff home, unexpectedly, four hours before the protest was expected to start, and we removed trashcans that could be thrown. To reduce protesters’ hope of good photo opportunities, we covered the company’s main headquarters sign and moved company trucks bearing the firm’s name out of sight. We also posted photographers on the roof. Thus we removed vulnerabilities (headquarters staff), protester tools (trashcans), and potential photo ops (of crowds massed in front of the corporate sign). Our threat analysis and protection measures kept key assets safe.

Airport protests. Sometimes a disruptive protest can be prevented or dispersed by emphasizing its illegality. In January 2017 protesters opposed to federal immigration policy massed at numerous U.S. airports, blocking pedestrian and vehicle movement. Most airports allowed the protests to continue, but protesters who tried to assemble at Denver International Airport were turned away by police because they did not have a permit as required by airport regulations (Rules and Regulations for the Management, Operation, Control, and Use of the Denver Municipal Airport System, section 50.03). Restrictions on speech activity at airports were upheld by the Supreme Court in International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee (1992), which stated that it is “well settled that the government need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and controls.” Thus, an airport can impose reasonable restrictions on protest activity.

The goal of security in an era of protests is a safe outcome: avoidance of death, injury, destruction of property, hindering of legitimate business activities, and damage to reputation. When protesters have violence in mind, a high-level, high-visibility deterrent may discourage them. When they are likely to behave in a nonviolent manner, a more subtle approach may avoid inflaming them and may keep them on a peaceful path.

MARTIN HERMAN IS PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF SPECIAL RESPONSE CORPORATION. HE IS A MEMBER OF THE NASCO BOARD OF DIRECTORS, A MEMBER OF ASIS, AND A PAST ASIS CHAPTER CHAIRMAN. 410-785-1212 - 14804 York Rd, Sparks, MD 21152 USA