Keep the Why with the What

Before the US Army became overwhelmed with operational combat tours following the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, the Army was a juggernaut of training.  We had become experts in training from all aspects, design, evaluation, and preparation.  The National Training Center (NTC) and the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)  and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC, Hoenfels, Germany) were the pinnacle of force on force training centers.  Specific units were trained as Opposing Forces (OPFOR) and drove in vehicles modified to look like the equipment our potential adversaries used.  A trip to a training center in a leadership role was a valuable period of growth in a leader’s life. So much so, that a “tour” to one of the training centers became a discriminating distinction on evaluation reports. 

This was great training.  It provided experiences that could not be replicated anywhere else.  The key ingredient to success in these centers was the ability to fail and grow.   If a unit was degraded by action, the affected people were removed to another location, equipment was sidelined and the leaders had to operate without those people and assets until reinforcements and replacement equipment arrived through the supply system.  Detailed After Action Review (AAR) sessions allowed the participants to view the consequences of decisions, actions and inactions in the context of the “big picture”. 

I recall one particular time where I was at the tipping point of a failed mission.  As the Aviation Liaison Officer to an Infantry brigade, my job was to coordinate helicopters in support of the Brigade’s missions.  The path of the mission request was usually from the Infantry Brigade Commander to the Brigade Operations officer, to one of a few Operations Battle Captains, to me, and I would run the path in reverse through the Aviation community to gain mission approval and support.  This time, the battle captain said ” We need a helicopter Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) for a civilian in the town.”    This was confusing to me.  At the time, MEDEVAC of a civilian was very rare.  MEDEVAC assets are usually closely guarded to support our troops, and the missions were through a completely different request channel.   I forwarded the request, which was initially denied, and during the time it took to clarify the mission, the civilian had been moved by ground.  He survived, but with consequences that might have been prevented had he been moved rapidly by air.

During the AAR, it was revealed that the civilian was the Mayor of the town, who commanded great influence with the population.  He was key to winning the support of the people of the region against the destabilizing element we were fighting.  If we showed him support, we could count on his reciprocation and our larger mission within the region would be easier.  The lack of support we provided served to demonstrate to the Mayor that we did not care about his people, so gaining their support was much harder and took longer. 

I was asked why the helicopters didn’t go get him, since he was so crucial to the success of the brigade’s mission.  As the message was communicated from Brigade commander, Operations officer and battle captain, the vital importance and reason for the mission lost urgency with every step.  By the time I was asking for MEDEVAC assets from the helicopter commander, the WHY of the action had faded into obscurity and all we were left with was the WHAT.  Since the “what” was something out of the ordinary, it was like asking for a hammer to fix a problem with a screw – It was denied until we could figure out the details.

The good part in all of this is no-one was really hurt.  It was all a simulation. I felt bad because I realized that I failed.  The better part is that I was able to grow from that failure.  All of us learned the importance of keeping the Why with the What; communicating each task with its purpose. 

JP