ENGINEERING IS DEVELOPMENT (Serialised) No 7

The Stressful Eighties

I welcome you again to our ongoing discourse on the role of engineering in the development of Nigeria. In the last few weeks, we have traced the origin, history and evolution of engineering as a major factor in the nation’s development. Using the book, Engineering Is Development as a guide, we have seen how delineations have allowed professionals to specialise their services. Remember that you can contact the managing director of ACEN anytime on (abolajiogunsanya@acen.org.ng) for enquiries regarding how to purchase the book.

Today, we start by asking: If the 70s was essentially the decade of formation of ACEN, how did the association fare in its first decade of existence? What were its main objectives, its challenges and its achievements? How did it go about achieving its objectives and in historical perspective, how much did it achieve in this first decade?

If the 70s was a period of economic boom, growth and relative peace for the nation and great opportunities for the engineer, what were the social, political and economic concerns of the 80s, and how did this impact on the engineer? 

Political and Economic Environment

After thirteen years of military rule (1966-1979), General Olusegun Obasanjo handed over power to a new civilian government under President Shehu Shagari on October 1, 1979. Nigeria's Second Republic was born with great expectations. Oil prices were still high and revenues were on the increase. It appeared that the pace of development of the seventies was still possible. Unfortunately, the euphoria was short-lived, and the second republic did not survive its infancy.

The Shagari administration was confronted with financial challenges. Governance cost had increased considerably with government ministers and civil servants living ostentatiously with corruption setting in on a massive scale. So, when the price of oil dropped sharply in 1981, half way through its tenure, Nigeria went into financial crisis and recession set in, putting severe strains on the administration and the citizens. For political reasons, government spending continued unabated, and the government started borrowing to meet its obligations. Nigeria's foreign debt increased from =N=3.3 billion in 1978 to =N=14.7 billion in 1982. As elections approached in August 1983, economic decline that reflected low oil prices, widespread corruption, and continued government spending at record levels was proof to many that the country was in bad shape. The lack of confidence was evident in the massive capital flight estimated at US$14 billion between 1979 and 1983.

On December 31, 1983, the military overthrew the civilian government. In an uncanny resemblance of recent Nigerian history, Major General Muhammadu Buhari emerged as the leader of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), the country's new ruling body with Brigadier Tunde Idiagbon as his second in command. The military regime launched a ‘War Against Indiscipline,’ preached ethics, emphasised patriotism, decried corruption and promoted environmental sanitation. Buhari's biggest problem, however, was Nigeria's foreign debt. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) dragged on, and in the end efforts to reschedule the debt failed.

The Buhari government was then peacefully overthrown by the SMC's third-ranking member General Ibrahim Babangida in August 1985. Babangida cited the misuse of power, violations of human rights by key officers of the SMC, and the government's failure to deal with the country's deepening economic crisis as justifications for the takeover. Dropping his military title of ‘General,’ Babangida took on the political title of ‘President’ and demonstrated his intent to encourage public participation in decision making by opening a national debate on proposed economic reform and recovery measures. He addressed the worsening recession through the Structural Adjustment Program, SAP of 1986. By 1986, 44 percent of export earning was being used to service foreign debt. Austerity was not enough; rescheduling the foreign debt was essential, but public opinion was against an IMF loan. The government already was committed to many of the conditionalities for the IMF loan, including even more austere measures. However, it resisted pressures to reduce the petroleum subsidy, to allow trade liberalization, and to devalue the Naira. Although negotiations with the IMF were suspended, the federal budget of 1986 still imposed many of the IMF conditionalitiess. On October 1, 1986, the government declared a National Economic Emergency, which lasted for fifteen months.

Under the emergency, the government de-emphasized large-scale agricultural projects and introduced salary and wage reductions for armed forces and for public and private-sector employees. Import restrictions were intensified, including a 30-percent surcharge on imports. Officially, the government now encouraged foreign investment and promoted privatization. Finally, the petroleum subsidy was cut back. Despite these drastic moves, efforts to reschedule the foreign debt without an IMF loan failed, and a drop in world oil prices further compounded Nigeria's situation. Eventually the World Bank stepped in to breach the gap and provided US$4.2 billion over three years to support the structural adjustment program. The eligible debt finally was rescheduled in early 1988. There was heavy devaluation of the naira in 1988, followed by even more drastic reductions in 1989 and early 1990. As a result of the recession, there was a drop in real income, especially for urban dwellers, while unemployment rose steadily to almost 12 percent in 1986. The situation in the second half of the 1980s was even worse, with per capita income falling below US$300 in 1988.

Engineering Development Projects

With the prevailing political and economic conditions in the eighties, engineering development projects suffered major setbacks. The Shagari administration continued with the development programmes of the seventies and added a few of its own. By far the biggest project at the time was the development of the Federal Capital City of Abuja.

Under the military government of Obasanjo, International Planning Associates (IPA), a joint venture of WRT, Planning Research Corporation, and Archisystems International, was contracted to plan a new national capital city for Nigeria that would be home for more than 3 million people. The new city, called Abuja, was intended to serve both as the new location for the Nigerian federal government as well as an important symbol of national unity. WRT created a distinctive identity for the city through site selection and detailed design of the central area, which comprises the national government centre, national cultural institutions, and the central business district. Outside the central area, residential mini-cities with populations of 150,000 to 250,000 are organized around local business and employment centres, and are connected to other parts of the city by exclusive transit-ways. The Shagari administration continued with this programme and many others. Even when the price of oil dropped in 1981, the projects continued. Without strong institutional framework for implementing these projects, however, they eventually ran into severe difficulties.

Three main factors influenced how engineering projects were run in the eighties. The first was the need for political control of ministries and parastatals of government. Ministers and chief executives of parastatals were chosen, not by professional competence or articulated programmes of action, but by patronage and loyalty to the president and the party. The effect of this was that most engineering driven ministries did not have engineering oriented leadership or programmes that could deliver the projects under their ministries.

Secondly, corruption became a challenge since capital expenditure of major engineering projects is often large and will always provide attraction for the greedy. The political leadership of these ministries had two main focuses, to make money for the party so as to be able to run the next election, and to make money for themselves so as to continue to be relevant in the scheme of things.

The third challenge was the need to show accomplishment to the public by the government, meaning that the projects be visible and be completed within the tenure of the incumbent. This ensured that experienced foreign companies with long track records were to be preferred to young local companies with properly trained staff and enthusiasm but little experience. Foreign companies, supported by their home governments, embassies and donor agencies, presented attractive proposals and were very successful in winning projects.

The resulting effect of these factors included the lack of any strategy for the development of local competence in engineering and construction, provision of unsustainable infrastructures, high cost of projects mostly in foreign exchange, unemployment and under-employment of engineers, among others.

Engineering Administration

The Ministry of Works and Housing had nine ministers between October 1979 and 1990. However, only one of them, Engr. Barnabas Gemade, was a COREN-registered engineer and he served only for eleven months. Mr Wahab Dosunmu trained as a town planner and gave support to ACEN. For the first time, a federal minister endorsed the association and prescribed its membership as one of the considerations to be evaluated in the award of consulting assignment by his ministry. Major General Kontagora although a military officer also trained as an engineer and his six-year tenure allowed him to adequately understand the ministry. The Scale of Fees was revised and approved under his tenure.

In the book, you can read more about the historical evolution of ACEN, its leadership, membership and challenges over the years. None of the organs responsible for engineering development had any strategic response to the challenges of the eighties. Not the Federal Ministry of Works, not COREN, NSE, ACEN or any other societies, not the universities or research centres fundamentally addressed the issues and challenges of this period.

Has much changed since then? What do you think? Let’s take this discussion to the next level. Your input is needed – in the comment box, by sharing and or facilitating sessions so that we can develop our nation together.

Thanks and see you next week.

Bayo Adeola +234(0)8022910259; kaa@cpmslimited.com; www.cpmslimited.com