The Quantum Clock Is Ticking Sixty-three per cent of organisations are concerned about the future encryption compromise posed by quantum computing. And 58% are worried about harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks — adversaries intercepting encrypted data today to decrypt it once quantum capability matures (Thales, 2025 Data Threat Report). NIST has responded. Their 2024 transition guide recommends phasing out RSA and ECC by 2030 and discontinuing them entirely by 2035. That's not a distant horizon. For organisations with long data retention requirements — healthcare, financial services, government, defence — the data they're encrypting today may still be sensitive when quantum decryption becomes viable. Fifty-seven per cent of organisations are prototyping or evaluating post-quantum cryptography algorithms. That's a good start. But fewer than half have assessed their current encryption strategies against the quantum threat. Cryptographic agility — the ability to transition encryption methods without rearchitecting entire systems — needs to be built into infrastructure now. Retrofitting it later will be exponentially more expensive and disruptive. The quantum threat isn't theoretical. The preparation window is practical, finite, and shrinking. https://buff.ly/dl9mJCF #CyberSecurity #QuantumComputing #Encryption #DataSecurity #CyberResilience
Quantum Threat Looms: NIST Urges RSA, ECC Retirement by 2035
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When Today’s Encryption Becomes Tomorrow’s Vulnerability what happens when the cryptography protecting our financial systems, telecommunication networks, and government data can no longer be trusted? With quantum computing advancing, current encryption algorithms face real risk, from the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat, this means sensitive data captured today could be exposed in the future. Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is designed to address this by developing algorithms resistant to quantum attacks while remaining practical for today’s systems. A key example is NIST’s standardization of CRYSTALS-Kyber, signaling that the shift toward quantum-resistant security is already underway. For sectors like banking, telecommunications, and government, this is not just a technical issue, it is a long-term risk management priority. From an IT audit perspective, the real question is how prepared organizations are to transition and ensure cryptographic agility. The move to PQC will take time but delaying action increases exposure. I am keen to connect and collaborate with researchers and professionals working on PQC, especially those translating theory into real-world implementation. How is your organization preparing for quantum readiness? #CyberSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #PQC #Encryption #QuantumComputing #ITAudit
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DAY 17 - Quantum Harvesting Threat Attackers don’t need to wait for quantum computers to be built. They can start attacking today. They quietly record your encrypted data — messages, transactions, communications — and store it for years, waiting for quantum computers to decrypt it later. This is called “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”. And it’s already happening. Your current encryption? It could become a time bomb tomorrow. Attackers are harvesting massive amounts of encrypted data right now. They don’t need quantum power today — they just need patience. When quantum computers arrive, everything you thought was secure today could be exposed. The Breakthrough: Zbelthas was built with post-quantum cryptography from day one. - ML-KEM-768 for key exchange - ML-DSA-87 for signatures Even if your data is harvested today, it remains completely secure against future quantum attacks. For Beta and final release users, this means real future-proof protection. Your communications and transactions stay safe — not just today, but for decades to come. No more worrying about “harvest now, decrypt later” attacks. Today’s data protected against tomorrow’s quantum computers. This isn’t hope. This is cryptographic foresight. From vulnerable encryption → to quantum-resistant security. Who’s already thinking about protecting their digital life against tomorrow’s threats? Read more about our hybrid approach 👇 https://lnkd.in/dmHw5GXJ #QuantumSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #HarvestNowDecryptLater #Zbelthas #CryptoSecurity #Web3
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Are we already too late for quantum security? We often hear about “Q-Day” — the moment when quantum computers break today’s encryption. But there’s a more practical concept that deserves attention: Mosca time, introduced by Michele Mosca. 👉 Here’s the idea in simple terms: X = How long your data must stay secure Y = Time needed to upgrade your systems to quantum-safe cryptography Z = Time until quantum computers can break current encryption ⚠️ If X + Y > Z, you already have a problem. Why? Because attackers don’t need to break encryption today. They can collect encrypted data now and decrypt it later using future quantum computers — enabled by advances like Shor's algorithm. 💡 This is known as: “harvest now, decrypt later.” 🚨 What this means for organizations: Sensitive data (health, finance, IP, government) often needs protection for 10+ years. Migration to post-quantum cryptography takes years, not months Waiting for Q-Day is already too late ✅ Takeaway: Quantum risk isn’t a future problem — it’s a timeline problem. And according to Mosca time, that timeline may already be working against us. #CyberSecurity #QuantumComputing #PostQuantum #Cryptography #RiskManagement
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The 2029 timeline for quantum computers breaking current encryption is no longer a distant hypothetical. Recent research from Google has moved up estimates for Q-Day, the point at which quantum computers could compromise the encryption protecting much of the internet. This accelerated timeline carries serious implications for every organization that relies on public key cryptography, which is essentially all of them. Here is what makes this particularly urgent: The "harvest now, decrypt later" threat is already active. Adversaries are collecting encrypted data today with the expectation that future quantum computers will be able to read it. Sensitive information stolen years ago could become fully exposed once cryptographically relevant quantum computers arrive. The path forward is post-quantum cryptography, and the groundwork is already being laid. NIST has published post-quantum standards. Major platforms are beginning to integrate quantum-safe protocols into end-user devices. Roughly 40 percent of the most popular websites now support hybrid post-quantum key exchange. But enterprise readiness still lags far behind. Most organizations lack even a basic cryptographic inventory, meaning they do not know where vulnerable encryption lives across their environments. Migration to post-quantum cryptography is not a simple swap. It requires dependency mapping, algorithm selection aligned with published standards, and integration testing across complex and often legacy infrastructure. The good news is that many of the steps required for quantum readiness, such as cryptographic discovery, automation, and cryptographic agility, also address other pressing challenges like shortened certificate lifespans. Organizations that start now will build resilience on multiple fronts. The conversation has shifted from awareness to execution, and the window for preparation is narrowing. #QuantumComputing #PostQuantumCryptography #Cybersecurity #DataProtection #TechInnovation
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Quantum computers do not need to be here today to pose a real threat to data security tomorrow. A recent analysis from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia lays out the timeline and implications clearly. Experts surveyed estimate that a quantum computer capable of breaking widely used public-key cryptography could be operational within 5 to 15 years. That window matters because of a deceptively simple inequality: if the number of years your data needs to stay secure, plus the time it takes to upgrade your cryptographic infrastructure, exceeds the timeline for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, you are already past your risk tolerance. The core issue is Shor's algorithm. It can efficiently solve the mathematical problems that underpin RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, which protect nearly all of today's digital communications, authentication, and financial transactions. The good news is that the path forward is well defined. NIST finalized three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, offering encryption methods that resist quantum attacks. Organizations are also exploring hybrid encryption schemes and building cryptographic agility into their systems so they can swap in stronger algorithms as threats evolve. The recommended steps are practical: assign a migration team, inventory your cryptographic assets, engage vendors on their roadmaps, develop a prioritized migration strategy, and invest in employee education. The quantum threat to cryptography is not speculative. Preparing for this transition is a present-day necessity. #QuantumComputing #CyberSecurity #DataSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #Cryptography
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QKD vs Post-Quantum Cryptography — which one actually wins? As quantum threats become more real, two approaches are getting a lot of attention: - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Both aim to secure communication in a future with quantum computers. But they take very different approaches. QKD - QKD distributes encryption keys using quantum states. - Security is information-theoretic under ideal assumptions - Eavesdropping introduces detectable disturbances (via higher error rates) - Requires specialized infrastructure (quantum + classical channels) Today, it is mostly limited to pilot deployments and high-security environments. PQC - PQC uses classical cryptographic algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks. - Security is based on computational hardness assumptions - Believed to be resistant to quantum attacks - Works on existing infrastructure It is already moving toward standardization and real-world adoption. The real question. This isn’t just about security. It’s about what actually scales in practice. Likely outcome: QKD may be used in: - defense and government networks - critical infrastructure - highly controlled environments PQC is more likely to: - scale across industries - integrate into existing systems - become the default standard Final thought!! The future is probably not QKD vs PQC. It’s: PQC for scale, QKD for specialized use cases. Curious to hear your view. Which approach will dominate? - QKD - PQC - Both (different use cases) - Too early to tell Comment 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 #QuantumComputing #CyberSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumCommunication #DeepTech
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Look at the hybrid QKD solution from Quantropi. It uses the ETSI 014 QKD standard interface, and delivers the keys Out of Band using on prem or SaaS QRNG. But it's an IPsec MACsec solution, and brings PQC into the initial handshake agreement but brings all the benefits of QKD key exchange. It's deployable now because it sits on existing network infrastructure. DM me if anyone needs to see the Deutche Telekom White Paper on this solution. Thanks for reading my comment.
Quantum @PsiQuantum | Ex IBM Quantum | Founder @QuantumGrad | Fusion Fund Fellow | Qiskit Advocate | LinkedIn Quantum Top Voice | MS @CMU | Ex-BNP Paribas
QKD vs Post-Quantum Cryptography — which one actually wins? As quantum threats become more real, two approaches are getting a lot of attention: - Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) - Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Both aim to secure communication in a future with quantum computers. But they take very different approaches. QKD - QKD distributes encryption keys using quantum states. - Security is information-theoretic under ideal assumptions - Eavesdropping introduces detectable disturbances (via higher error rates) - Requires specialized infrastructure (quantum + classical channels) Today, it is mostly limited to pilot deployments and high-security environments. PQC - PQC uses classical cryptographic algorithms designed to resist quantum attacks. - Security is based on computational hardness assumptions - Believed to be resistant to quantum attacks - Works on existing infrastructure It is already moving toward standardization and real-world adoption. The real question. This isn’t just about security. It’s about what actually scales in practice. Likely outcome: QKD may be used in: - defense and government networks - critical infrastructure - highly controlled environments PQC is more likely to: - scale across industries - integrate into existing systems - become the default standard Final thought!! The future is probably not QKD vs PQC. It’s: PQC for scale, QKD for specialized use cases. Curious to hear your view. Which approach will dominate? - QKD - PQC - Both (different use cases) - Too early to tell Comment 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 #QuantumComputing #CyberSecurity #PostQuantumCryptography #QuantumCommunication #DeepTech
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The Quantum Threat: Why Your Encryption Has an Expiration Date While most conversations around quantum computing focus on speed, the real disruption is happening in cybersecurity. We are heading toward a “cryptographic cliff”, where today’s encryption may suddenly become obsolete. The Reality Behind Current Encryption Standards like RSA encryption and Elliptic Curve Cryptography secure everything,from banking systems to government communications. They are trusted because breaking them with classical computers would take thousands of years. But quantum computing changes the rules. What Makes Quantum So Dangerous? With Shor's Algorithm: • Problems that take 10,000+ years today • Could be solved in hours This isn’t theoretical anymore, it’s a matter of time. The Threat is Already Here Encryption isn’t broken today… but attackers are already preparing. • “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” is real • Data stolen today can be decrypted in the future • Your current data could become tomorrow’s breach What Organizations Should Be Doing Now • Crypto Agility Be ready to replace encryption without rebuilding entire systems • Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) Adopt quantum-resistant algorithms (like lattice-based cryptography) • Proactive Data Protection Identify long-term sensitive data that must stay secure for years What This Means: Quantum computing isn’t just innovation, it’s a security reset. And the shift to quantum-safe systems takes years. So if you're not preparing now, you're already behind. #CyberSecurity #QuantumComputing #Encryption #InfoSec #PostQuantum #CyberRisk #DataSecurity #CloudSecurity #SOC #DigitalTransformation #CyberThreat #SecurityLeadership #FutureTech #ZeroTrust #TechLeadership
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Every encrypted file you send today has a shelf life. The mathematics protecting it was built for classical computers. It is not built for quantum ones. This is the "harvest now, decrypt later" risk. Encrypted data captured today, even if unreadable now, may be decryptable later once sufficiently capable quantum computers exist. The guidance is no longer speculative: - Australia’s Signals Directorate says organisations should complete their transition to post-quantum cryptography by the end of 2030. - The U.S. Federal Reserve published research on harvest-now, decrypt-later risks in September 2025, with an update in January 2026. - The G7 Cyber Expert Group released a roadmap for coordinating the transition to post-quantum cryptography in January 2026. - NIST is encouraging organisations to begin transitioning to the new post-quantum standards as soon as possible. So the real question is not whether this transition is coming. It is whether your most sensitive documents will still be protected when it does. How long does your most sensitive document need to stay confidential? If the answer is more than six years - legal files, IP, medical records, financial contracts, board papers - the shelf life matters now. Not when quantum computers arrive. Now. Because the decision on what cryptography to use for today’s documents is the decision that determines whether those documents are still protected in 2032. Post-quantum cryptography is not a future problem. It is a present design choice. #CyberSecurity #QuantumComputing #DataProtection #PostQuantumCryptography
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🚀 Discovering Emerging Threats in Quantum Cryptography In the world of cybersecurity, the arrival of quantum computing represents a monumental challenge for current encryption systems. This article explores how quantum algorithms could break the foundations of the digital security we know, and proposes strategies to mitigate these risks before it's too late. 🔍 Understanding the Quantum Impact Quantum computing accelerates processes that would take centuries on classical computers, threatening protocols like RSA and ECC. Researchers highlight that a quantum computer with enough qubits could decrypt keys in minutes, exposing sensitive data in banking, communications, and more. • ⚡ Exponential speed: Algorithms like Shor's factorize large numbers instantly, invalidating asymmetric encryptions. • 🛡️ Transition to post-quantum: NIST is already standardizing resistant algorithms, such as lattice-based cryptography, for future implementations. • 📈 Real scenarios: Companies must audit infrastructures and gradually migrate to hybrid cryptosystems. 🛠️ Practical Steps to Prepare For organizations, the path to quantum resilience involves thorough assessments and early adoption of secure technologies. The article details open-source tools to simulate quantum attacks and plan defenses, emphasizing collaboration between developers and security experts. For more information visit: https://enigmasecurity.cl #Cybersecurity #QuantumComputing #Encryption #TechSecurity #QuantumThreats If this content has been useful to you, consider donating to the Enigma Security community to continue supporting more news: https://lnkd.in/evtXjJTA Connect with me on LinkedIn to discuss security topics: https://lnkd.in/ex7ST38j 📅 Sun, 05 Apr 2026 20:44:10 GMT 🔗Subscribe to the Membership: https://lnkd.in/eh_rNRyt
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the gap isn't technical capability, it's organizational inertia. most orgs know quantum's coming but treat crypto agility like a nice-to-have instead of infrastructure debt. by the time procurement catches up, they'll be retrofitting under pressure instead of migrating on their terms