math-codegen RCE via String Literal Injection

math-codegen, Remote Code Execution (RCE) via String Literal Injection, GHSA-p6x5-p4xf-cc4r (Critical) The vulnerability resides in how `math-codegen` processes string literals. When an application passes user‑controlled input to cg.parse(), the library does not sanitize or escape the string content. Instead, it injects that content verbatim into the body of a dynamically generated JavaScript function using new Function(...). This turns any unsanitized string literal into executable code. An attacker can craft a malicious expression containing system commands (e.g., …...

mathjs, Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes, GHSA-jvff-x2qm-6286 (High) The vulnerability resides in the expression parser of the mathjs library, specifically in how it handles dynamically‑determined object attributes. When a user‑supplied expression is evaluated, the parser fails to properly sanitize or restrict the modification of these dynamic attributes. An attacker can craft an expression that manipulates object properties in a way that escapes the intended sandbox. By leveraging JavaScript’s prototype chain or by overwriting internal methods, the malicious expression can break out of the parser’s context and execute arbitrary JavaScript code....

mathjs, Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes, GHSA-jvff-x2qm-6286 (High) The vulnerability resides in the expression parser of the mathjs library, specifically in how it handles dynamically‑determined object attributes. When a user‑supplied expression is evaluated, the parser fails to properly sanitize or restrict the modification of these dynamic attributes. An attacker can craft an expression that manipulates object properties in a way that escapes the intended sandbox. By leveraging JavaScript’s prototype chain or by overwriting internal methods, the malicious expression can break out of the parser’s context and execute arbitrary JavaScript code....

AgentService (Nodejs), YAML Deserialization RCE, CVE-2020-8131 (Critical) The CVE-2020-8131 vulnerability exists in the js-yaml library when the `load()` function parses YAML without a safe schema. By default, js-yaml supports custom tags like `!!js/function` and !!js/undefined, which allow embedding and evaluating JavaScript code. The vulnerable `AgentService.loadAgentFromFile` method at `src/agents/agent.service.ts:55` calls `yaml.load(fileContent)` without specifying `JSON_SCHEMA` or DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA. An attacker crafts a YAML file containing !!js/function > function(){ require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pwned') }...

AgentService (Nodejs), YAML Deserialization RCE, CVE-2020-8131 (Critical) The CVE-2020-8131 vulnerability exists in the js-yaml library when the `load()` function parses YAML without a safe schema. By default, js-yaml supports custom tags like `!!js/function` and !!js/undefined, which allow embedding and evaluating JavaScript code. The vulnerable `AgentService.loadAgentFromFile` method at `src/agents/agent.service.ts:55` calls `yaml.load(fileContent)` without specifying `JSON_SCHEMA` or DEFAULT_SAFE_SCHEMA. An attacker crafts a YAML file containing !!js/function > function(){ require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pwned') }...

🤔 Why do we use JSON.stringify() when sending data over a network? It's not just a JavaScript quirk — it's a fundamental concept in systems design. Most developers use it out of habit. But understanding why reveals something deeper about how computers actually work. Your object isn't data — it's memory. When you create a JavaScript object, it lives in your machine's heap — a web of pointers and engine-specific structures that only your running process understands. V8 lays it out differently than SpiderMonkey. Those memory addresses mean absolutely nothing to a client across the wire. You can't "send" memory. You can only send bytes. Think of it like a thought in your head — rich and instant, but impossible to transmit directly. You translate it into words first. JSON.stringify() is that translation. JS sends: "[object Object]" — useless res.send(userObject); // Serializes into something transferable res.json(userObject); // JSON.stringify() under the hood This is where the OSI Model connects. Your JS code lives at Layer 7 (Application). But by the time your data hits Layer 1 (Physical) — electrical signals, fiber, radio waves — it's been broken down and re-wrapped multiple times. Every layer speaks its own format. Layer 7 - Application → JSON.stringify() your object Layer 6 - Presentation → Encoding & encryption (TLS) Layer 4 - Transport → TCP segments Layer 3 - Network → IP routing Layer 1 - Physical → Raw bits on the wire JSON.stringify() is your first step in that entire journey. This isn't a JavaScript problem. Python pickles. Java serializes. Go marshals. Every language faces the same constraint — data must become portable before it can travel. The takeaway? JSON.stringify() isn't just a utility function. It's Layer 7 doing its job — preparing your data for a journey through the entire network stack. The best engineers don't just know what works. They know where it fits in the bigger picture.

simple-git, Command Injection Bypass, N/A (critical) The vulnerability arises from an incorrect patch for CVE-2022-25860 in simple-git versions ≤3.28.0. The library allows JavaScript to run native Git commands. Some Git options (e.g., -u, --upload-pack) can execute arbitrary commands, so they are blocked unless `allowUnsafePack` is explicitly enabled. The blocking logic resides in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts, which uses regex patterns to reject options like `-u` and…...

simple-git, Command Injection Bypass, N/A (critical) The vulnerability arises from an incorrect patch for CVE-2022-25860 in simple-git versions ≤3.28.0. The library allows JavaScript to run native Git commands. Some Git options (e.g., -u, --upload-pack) can execute arbitrary commands, so they are blocked unless `allowUnsafePack` is explicitly enabled. The blocking logic resides in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts, which uses regex patterns to reject options like `-u` and…...

#Javascript Implemented Form Validation using DOM and Regex Patterns. Built validations for: -> Username -> Full Name -> Password -> Email -> Mobile Number Patterns used: Username -> ^[A-Za-z0-9]{3,15}$ Full Name -> ^[A-Za-z ]{3,30}$ Password -> ^(?=.[a-z])(?=.[A-Z])(?=.*[0-9]).{8,}$ Email -> ^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-z0-9.-]+.[a-z]{2,}$ Mobile Number -> ^[6-9][0-9]{9}$ Used DOM to: -> Access input fields -> Validate using checkValidity() -> Control navigation after submission 10000 Coders Raviteja Abdul Rahman

The -bash API Leak That Shook My University—How One JS File Exposed It All Introduction: Modern web applications, especially those built with frameworks like React, often rely heavily on client-side JavaScript. While this enhances user experience, it also creates a significant security risk: all frontend code is visible to anyone. Attackers and bug bounty hunters routinely analyze these JavaScript files to uncover hidden API endpoints, which, if not properly secured, can lead to massive data leaks....