Cycode and Akamai WAF Integration for Contextual API Security

🔥 High Risk Vulnerability Alert! Budibase, an open-source low-code platform, has a serious authentication bypass issue (CVE-2026-41428). Attackers can access protected endpoints by manipulating the query string. This highlights the importance of secure API design. Update to version 3.35.4 to fix this issue. Stay safe! #Budibase #APIsecurity #OWASP #CVE202641428 https://lnkd.in/gY-k9zYQ

5 protocols. 7 days. 1 attack pattern. No smart contract exploit. Attackers: → socially engineered domain access → redirected DNS → deployed identical frontend → inserted a wallet drainer Users hit the correct URL Signed transactions Funds gone instantly This is the part most teams still miss: Nothing was broken onchain. These attacks happen entirely in the layer users trust to access Web3. And once a user signs, it’s already over. The transaction is final and irreversible () The shift is clear: Security can’t stop at contracts or wallets. You need to understand: → where the interaction came from → what the transaction actually does → whether it should be allowed at all That’s the difference between detecting an attack and stopping it before funds move. This is exactly the problem space we operate in. Blockaid https://lnkd.in/eSjBfzQh

MinIO, Authentication Bypass, No CVE (Critical) The vulnerability exists in MinIO’s handling of STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER requests. When processing PutObject or PutObjectPart calls, the function newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader receives a boolean signature gate that depends only on whether the Authorization HTTP header is present. Simultaneously, isPutActionAllowed extracts credentials from either the Authorization header or the X-Amz-Credential query parameter, trusting whichever it finds. An attacker omits the Authorization header entirely and places a valid access key (e.g., minioadmin) inside X-Amz-Credential in the query string....

MinIO, Authentication Bypass, No CVE (Critical) The vulnerability exists in MinIO’s handling of STREAMING-UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD-TRAILER requests. When processing PutObject or PutObjectPart calls, the function newUnsignedV4ChunkedReader receives a boolean signature gate that depends only on whether the Authorization HTTP header is present. Simultaneously, isPutActionAllowed extracts credentials from either the Authorization header or the X-Amz-Credential query parameter, trusting whichever it finds. An attacker omits the Authorization header entirely and places a valid access key (e.g., minioadmin) inside X-Amz-Credential in the query string....

Security incidents are never easy to talk about, but transparency matters. Vercel confirmed unauthorized access to internal systems 1 day ago, impacting a limited subset of customers. Early reports suggest possible exposure of environment variables. Three immediate actions if you use Vercel: 1. Rotate all secrets API keys, DB URLs, tokens. Assume env vars were exposed. 2. Audit access logs for anomalies in the last 7-14 days 3. Enable 2FA + IP allowlisting on every critical service downstream of Vercel The security bulletin: http://vercel.com/security Reminder: Your build platform is part of your supply chain. Treat secrets like they can leak, because sometimes they do. #WebSecurity #DevOps #CloudSecurity #Vercel #IncidentResponse #SoftwareEngineering

Signature-based authentication requires more than verifying public keys. Implementing Web3 login with NextAuth creates security risks if nonces are reused or not bound to the initial request. In production, we identified replay attack vectors where intercepted signatures could be used to spoof sessions across different environments. We transitioned to a strict challenge-response architecture. The server generates a unique, one-time nonce stored in an encrypted, HTTP-only cookie. The user signs this specific string. On verification, the backend invalidates the nonce immediately, regardless of success. This adds minor latency but guarantees that every authentication attempt is unique and cryptographically tied to a single request lifecycle. - Use server-side nonces to prevent signature replay attacks. - Validate the relationship between the wallet address and the session ID. - Implement short TTLs for challenges to minimize the exploit window. How do you manage session persistence after verifying a cryptographic signature? #nextjs #web3 #authentication #security #typescript #softwareengineering #MuhammadAsim #MehfilAI

Undercode Platform, Multiple Authentication Bypasses, No CVE (Critical) How the mentioned vulnerabilities work (technical details): The platform runs in "authenticated" mode but fails to enforce auth on several API endpoints due to missing middleware checks. Each endpoint handler receives `actor: { type: "none" }` and proceeds without rejection. 1. GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues – No `assertCompanyAccess` call. An attacker with a valid run UUID (leaked via logs, error messages, or brute-force) can retrieve heartbeat run issues....

Undercode Platform, Multiple Authentication Bypasses, No CVE (Critical) How the mentioned vulnerabilities work (technical details): The platform runs in "authenticated" mode but fails to enforce auth on several API endpoints due to missing middleware checks. Each endpoint handler receives `actor: { type: "none" }` and proceeds without rejection. 1. GET /api/heartbeat-runs/:runId/issues – No `assertCompanyAccess` call. An attacker with a valid run UUID (leaked via logs, error messages, or brute-force) can retrieve heartbeat run issues....

🚨 High risk vulnerability in #GitLab! CVE-2025-3922 is a serious issue that could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service by overwhelming system resources. This is due to insufficient resource allocation limits in the GraphQL API. It's a reminder of the importance of #APISecurity. Stay safe! #OWASP #CVE20253922 #DoS https://lnkd.in/g-KRbQyE

🚨 High risk vulnerability detected in #eiceblue spire-doc-mcp-server! CVE-2026-7314 is a path traversal issue that can be exploited remotely. This highlights the importance of secure API design and function level authorization. The exploit is public and the vendor has not yet responded. Stay safe! #APIsecurity #OWASP #PathTraversal https://lnkd.in/gBcX53AF