Rob Plonski, PE

Does your organizational structure have a hidden turnover problem? In the DOE complex and government contracting world, matrix organizations are adopted on occasion. They make sense on paper. Technical expertise sits in functional organizations. Mission delivery sits in program organizations. The matrix is supposed to connect them. But a matrix only works when it is actively stewarded by leaders who understand the structure, protect technical authority, and manage where decision rights actually sit. In my experience working in this space requires consistent effort to steward and maintain the matrix often requiring an in depth understanding of matrix organizational theory. If management and leadership lacks that understanding of the nuances to a matrixed organization it may be tempting to utilize initiatives that employ “hard” or “soft” management fixes that only further complicate the matrix organizational structure and breakdown the much needed cooperation the matrix attempts to leverage. When it breaks down, the matrix does not collapse dramatically. It erodes quietly. Coordination load increases. Decision authority drifts toward whoever has schedule pressure. Adjustment costs fall disproportionately on your most technically invested contributors, your health physicists, your engineers, your subject matter experts, the people closest to the work and most accountable for getting it right. They absorb the friction. They fight battles the structure shouldn’t have created. Not because they want to, but because they have to in order to be productive. An eroded matrix stricture is best described as a spider web, everyone is connected but incapable of moving the organization forward, often due to power and interest imbalances within an organization that have crept in over many years. Eventually those with high interests stop fighting, they disengage, and then they leave. The organization rarely connects that departure to a structural failure that happened years earlier. It calls it turnover. It launches a hiring initiative. The cycle repeats. So here is my question for those of you working in DOE or government contracting environments. Are you seeing this pattern in your organizations, and do you think the structure itself is the problem or the stewardship of it? Has your organization taken matrixed structures too far?

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I wrote this white paper based on my experience serving on the NFPA 409 technical committee, conducting live, full-scale fire testing, and discussions I've had with those on the enforcement side of fire protection (Fire Marshals, AHJs, and Insurance Carriers). Although this white paper does not represent the views of NFPA or the NFPA 409 committee, it does express concerns that I repeatedly hear from enforcers. This loophole was created in the 2022 edition of the code and many within the fire protection industry are just beginning to see the unintended consequences of this change.

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I just released Version 2.0 of the guide with the following updates: - Mitigation Editor added - Facility vs ES Risk Matrix explained - Risk-based vs Hybrid Safety Submission - Updated DESR references - ES Transient Grouping discussed *This is primarily for use by the USAF using ESS Tier 2a and does not apply to others.

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RA.L2-3.11.1 requires organizations to periodically assess risk to systems processing CUI. Assessors look for documented risk assessments, risk registers, and evidence that risks are reviewed over time. Organizations without a defined risk process often miss their biggest vulnerabilities.

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The Fire Suppression Systems Association (FSSA) has published a new online training program intended to meet the EPA Fire Suppression Technician Training requirements in 40 CFR 84.110(d). Under the authority granted by the AIM Act, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires all technicians who install, service, repair, or dispose of fire suppression equipment that contains HFCs to receive training no later than June 1, 2026 or 30 days after date of hire, whichever is later. More information is available at https://lnkd.in/g3x4YXKT

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Lithium-ion battery fires etc produce atypical burns and inhalation injuries. Further to my earlier posts on this issue, the American Burn Association has issued an alert: “This is not a problem for tomorrow, it is a problem for today,” said ABA President, Jeff Carter, MD, FABA. “Every week, burn professionals are seeing patients with deeper, more complex injuries from lithium-ion devices. Prevention is no longer optional; it is urgent.”  Along with Krissy Styles M.Sc., a Plastic Surgery Clinical Nurse Specialist, EV Firesafe and burns and respiratory specialists from several institutions, the NU team are in the early stages of a collaboration to understand the magnitude of this problem. #lithiumionbatteries #lithiumionbattery #escooter #ebike #EVFiresafe #lithiumionsafety #newcastleuniversity https://lnkd.in/e96SBYvy

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Workplace testing programs do not fail only because of the test. https://lnkd.in/eWH5ZF_G They fail when the full framework is not defensible. Takeaways • Avoid dual-testing models that can produce conflicting results • Oral fluid is generally the more defensible medium across most workplace testing contexts • Policy, training, test reason, and method selection must work together • Define impairment in policy with CSA Z1008language, not after the fact in arbitration A defensible program is never just a test result. It is the system around it. #WorkplaceSafety #DrugTesting #OralFluid #FitForDuty #CSAZ1008

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