Jason Brown

Jason Brown

Washington DC-Baltimore Area
7K followers 500+ connections

Experience

  • Applied Intuition Graphic

    Applied Intuition

    Washington, District of Columbia, United States

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    Washington, District of Columbia, United States

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    Washington DC-Baltimore Area

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    Washington DC-Baltimore Area

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    Washington, District of Columbia, United States

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    Washington D.C. Metro Area

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    Washington D.C. Metro Area

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    Maxwell AFB

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    Pentagon

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Education

Licenses & Certifications

Publications

  • The Data-Driven Transformation of Intelligence

    The National Interest

    If the U.S. government is to deal with deceptive and elusive adversaries, the IC must make data, structured in a way to tell a story, the foundation for its intelligence assessments. Data analytics are changing how we approach economics, elections, health, security, business, and our daily routines. It is time for intelligence to catch up. Analysts must pair their intuition and expertise with data science to give decision-makers the best possible intelligence.

    See publication
  • We Can't Be Overrun: The Legacy of Khe Sanh

    The Strategy Bridge

    On July 9th, 1968, Viet Cong troops occupied the remnants of a US Marine base that crowned the Khe Sanh plateau in Quang Tri province. It was a face-saving move. From January through April, the communists poured in artillery, tanks, and thousands of troops, but American forces fought them off through logistics and firepower delivered principally from the air. Khe Sanh became a moment in American military history where, in real time, the battle for the narrative eclipsed the battle for terrain…

    On July 9th, 1968, Viet Cong troops occupied the remnants of a US Marine base that crowned the Khe Sanh plateau in Quang Tri province. It was a face-saving move. From January through April, the communists poured in artillery, tanks, and thousands of troops, but American forces fought them off through logistics and firepower delivered principally from the air. Khe Sanh became a moment in American military history where, in real time, the battle for the narrative eclipsed the battle for terrain. We can’t be overrun took on a strategic and tactical meaning at Khe Sanh, and became an important lesson for developing military capabilities decades later.

    See publication
  • Uploading John Boyd

    The Strategy Bridge

    The Legend delivering his opus is now online -- and is as relevant as ever.

    See publication
  • Time-Dominant Fusion in a Complex World

    Trajectory Magazine

    Driven by ISR’s salience to the conflicts of the past decade, the Air Force relies upon the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) to rapidly access and analyze information collected by airborne sensors in real time. At the same time, IC-developed technology is now delivering on the promise of nearly instantaneous access to much of the community’s collective data through a world of data clouds, metadata tagging, and apps. National agency databases, especially those developed and sustained by…

    Driven by ISR’s salience to the conflicts of the past decade, the Air Force relies upon the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) to rapidly access and analyze information collected by airborne sensors in real time. At the same time, IC-developed technology is now delivering on the promise of nearly instantaneous access to much of the community’s collective data through a world of data clouds, metadata tagging, and apps. National agency databases, especially those developed and sustained by the Combat Support Agencies, are becoming increasingly accessible. This access to troves of IC data allows DCGS analysts to fuse intelligence in proximity to the point of collection. Consequently, analysts can now meld new information with baseline knowledge in seconds and minutes, instead of what had taken hours and days. This analytic capability, forever sought but perpetually elusive, is rapidly becoming a reality.

    Other authors
    • David Vernal
    See publication
  • Strategy for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

    Joint Force Quarterly

    In the last 10 years, numerous reports have highlighted obstacles to the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into military campaigns and major operations. The root cause of many of these difficulties is adherence to a centralized Cold War collection management doctrine focused on production rather than goals and objectives. This Industrial Age concept is not agile enough to meet the challenges of military operations in the information age, which include…

    In the last 10 years, numerous reports have highlighted obstacles to the integration of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) into military campaigns and major operations. The root cause of many of these difficulties is adherence to a centralized Cold War collection management doctrine focused on production rather than goals and objectives. This Industrial Age concept is not agile enough to meet the challenges of military operations in the information age, which include compressed decision cycles and demands for operational precision. A strategy-oriented approach that balances ISR ends, ways, and means will more effectively meet commanders’ needs and expectations in today’s increasingly complex operating environments.

    See publication
  • Airpower is Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

    Air and Space Power Journal

    It is time for the Air Force to embrace its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) heritage. Once a core mission of the combat air forces, tactical reconnaissance gave way to niche ISR capabilities, and the roles and missions within the service became increasingly inflexible. The last decade of war has shown a need to reverse that trend.

    See publication
  • Power wins wars, but a lot depends on what kind of power you use and when

    Foreign Policy - The Best Defense

    In war, power wins. Individuals often confuse military might with power, but in reality, there are many power factors relevant to the outcome of war. Power flows from diplomatic, political, and economic strength as well as strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness. Sound analysis of warfare will avoid focusing on any one of these sources, and will instead examine relevant power, which accounts for the interplay of power sources within the context of conditions and rivals in a war.

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  • Operating the Distributed Common Ground System: A Look at the Human Factor in Network-Centric Operations

    Air and Space Power Journal

    This article provides a useful description of how the USAF’s Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, is manned and operated. Instead of describing the DCGS enterprise, this article analyses some of the key issues in closing the gap between the traditionally separate domains of intelligence and operations and focuses on the people aspect. Because ISR is operations, the intelligence personnel within the DCGS require new skills to meet their operational role. These personnel are no longer only…

    This article provides a useful description of how the USAF’s Distributed Common Ground System, or DCGS, is manned and operated. Instead of describing the DCGS enterprise, this article analyses some of the key issues in closing the gap between the traditionally separate domains of intelligence and operations and focuses on the people aspect. Because ISR is operations, the intelligence personnel within the DCGS require new skills to meet their operational role. These personnel are no longer only analysts and advisers; they are now operating a weapon system that is directly involved in the conduct of combat operations. As a result, new training and education mechanisms are being put in place and liaison officers are being deployed forward to work with the supported ground forces.

    See publication
  • Fighting for Intelligence: The Design of Intelligence-Led Operations

    Marine Corps University/DTIC

    The purpose of intelligence-led operations is to increase understanding of rival systems, an outcome that ultimately benefits all lines of operation. Operational design provides the framework to develop and guide intelligence in the pursuit of systemic awareness as well as campaign goals and objectives.

    See publication
  • To Bomb or Not To Bomb?: Counterinsurgency, Airpower, and Dynamic Targeting

    Air and Space Power Journal

    Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as “dynamic targeting.” These types of strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns due to subsequent collateral damage, whether real or perceived. However, Major Brown asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counter­insurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid assessment of the enemy and population will produce positive…

    Air strikes, independent from ground operations, are known as “dynamic targeting.” These types of strikes have typically been counterproductive in counterinsurgency campaigns due to subsequent collateral damage, whether real or perceived. However, Major Brown asserts that commanders and planners who integrate dynamic targeting into the counter­insurgency campaign using careful target selection; quick, precise employment; and solid assessment of the enemy and population will produce positive, tangible results.

    See publication
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